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1 Introduction 
Unemployment remains an important economic and social concern in Europe, even 
though in the European Union (EU) the (overall) unemployment rate has steadily decreased 
from 10.9% in 2013 to 6.8% in 2018 (Eurostat). This is particularly true for some vulnerable 
groups, such as youth, older workers, and migrants. Policy makers therefore have continued 
interest in getting a better understanding of which labour market policies work for which type 
of unemployed. Such understanding helps to improve the counselling process, the design and 
the allocation of active labour market policies.  
However, uncovering heterogeneity in the effectiveness of policies is challenging from 
an econometric point of view, because it requires estimators that are at the same time suffi-
ciently flexible and sufficiently precise when predicting causal effects at such a fine grained-
level. Recent developments in causal machine learning (CML) addressed this problem and of-
fered promising solutions. In this paper we use such a CML approach for multiple treatments 
to evaluate the heterogeneity in the effectiveness of training programmes in Flanders, a region 
in the North of Belgium. We then use our estimates to uncover specific heterogeneity and to 
show the extent the public employment service (PES) can enhance the effectiveness of these 
programmes by changing the assignment of unemployed job seekers to these programmes.  
Machine learning methods are traditionally used for prediction (e.g. Hastie, Tibshirani, 
and Friedman, 2009). More recently, these methods have been modified such that are useful for 
causal inference as well (see Athey 2019, and Athey and Imbens, 2019, for overviews). This 
literature shows how the counterfactual causal problem (e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge 2009) can 
be transformed into a combination of specific prediction problems. For this paper, these meth-
ods are of interest because they provide a way to systematically uncover the underlying heter-
ogeneity of the causal effects, a goal for which traditional econometric methods fail to provide 
a systematic solution. 
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In this paper identification of the causal effect relies on the assumption of unconfounded-
ness. Knaus, Lechner and Strittmatter (2018) evaluate the performance of various CML meth-
ods for binary treatments suitable under unconfoundedness using an Empirical Monte Carlo 
approach (see e.g. Huber et al. 2013; Lechner and Wunsch 2013). As opposed to a standard 
Monte Carlo analysis, such an approach informs the data generating process (DGP) as much as 
possible by real data and reduces the synthetic components in the DGP to a minimum. The real 
data are taken from the Swiss social security records that were used to evaluate a job search 
programme of the unemployed (Knaus, Lechner and Strittmatter 2017). Knaus, Lechner and 
Strittmatter (2018) conclude that the Forest based ML methods, in particular the Generalized 
Forest by Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager (2018), belong to the best performing estimators if 
explicitly adjusted to take account of confounding. Subsequently, Lechner (2018) proposes the 
Modified Causal Forest (MCF) estimator. It builds on the estimators proposed by Wager and 
Athey (2018) and Athey et al. (2018). One innovation is that Lechner (2018) improves the 
objective function used to build the trees of the Causal Forest. The second innovation proposed 
is to use weight-based inference methods as a computationally cheap and reliable device to 
estimate the precision of the estimated treatment effects at the various aggregation levels of 
interest, from the individualized to the (grouped) average treatment effects. Based on an Em-
pirical Monte Carlo analysis, Lechner (2018) shows that the MCF estimator outperforms pre-
viously suggested estimators in nonexperimental settings. Since the MCF allows to effectively 
address programme heterogeneity as well as individual heterogeneity at various levels, has at-
tractive theoretical properties and seems to perform well in practice, it is our estimator of 
choice. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the first papers that applies CML meth-
ods to analyse treatment heterogeneity in the evaluation of active labour market policies. It 
appears also to be the first paper to use perform such analysis in a multiple treatment context. 
Knaus, Lechner and Strittmatter (2017) use Lasso based methods to evaluate the effect hetero-
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geneity of a (single) job search programme in Switzerland using admin data from 2003. They 
find substantial effect heterogeneity, but only during the first six months after the start of pro-
gramme participation. Bertrand, Crépon, Marguerie and Premand (2017) apply the Causal Ran-
dom Forest method of Wager and Athey (2018) within a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to 
evaluate the programme heterogeneity of a temporary public works programme in a less devel-
oped country. Their analysis reveals important heterogeneity, but again mostly during pro-
gramme participation. Faltings, Krumer, and Lechner (2019) use the MCF approach to analysis 
regional favouritism of referees in the top Swiss soccer league. 
This paper uses administrative data of the Flemish PES. The analysis is based on the 
population of about 60.000 individuals aged between 21 and 55 who started claiming unem-
ployment insurance benefits after an involuntary lay-off between December 2014 and June 
2016. To follow-up labour market outcomes during at least 2.5 years (until September 2019), 
we evaluate the impact of participating in training programmes that were entered within the 
first nine months of the unemployment spell. We focus the analysis on three training pro-
grammes: short-term (less than 6 months) vocational training (SVT), longer-term (between 6 
and 10 months) vocational training (LVT) and orientation training (OT) that aims at helping to 
determine a clear professional goal.1F1  
The interest in using data from the Flemish PES is threefold. First, the type of training 
offered to the unemployed are like those offered in most other EU countries, so that findings 
for Flanders are of general interest. Second, the administrative data is very informative. In ad-
dition to rich socio-demographic information, the data contains extensive information on labour 
market histories (including sickness and past programme participation) of individuals since 
                                                                
1  Other programs were not considered for various reasons: (i) they did not pass a placebo test; (ii) Dutch language training 
because of lack of comparison observations (common support problem); (iii) they lasted too long (more than 10 months) in 
view of the time horizon of 2.5 years; (iv) on-the-job training, because participants were selected after hiring; (v) they were 
too small and too heterogeneous to be aggregated in a meaningful group. 
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1991. This makes the assumption of unconfoundedness, which is used for identification, argu-
ably plausible. In fact, in a placebo exercise unconfoundedness could not be rejected. Third, the 
Flemish PES displayed a high willingness to employ CML methods in the future programme 
evaluations and assignments. 
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. There is a clear dominance 
ordering in terms of the average effectiveness of the three programmes considered, both in the 
short-run (lock-in effects) as in the medium run (post-programme effect): SVT clearly performs 
best, followed by LVT. Although OT also shows positive post-programme effects, the lock-in 
effects are so large and enduring, that the overall effect in our observation period is negative. 
After 2.5 years, participation in SVT increases on average the time spent in employment by 3.4 
months relative to no participation. For LVT this gain is only 1 month, while participation in 
OT decreases the number of months in employment by 1.4. There is considerable heterogeneity 
in the aforementioned effects. The effects are especially higher for recent migrants with a low 
proficiency in Dutch, which is the official language in Flanders. The level of education is also 
an important determinant of the programme effects. The effectiveness of these programmes 
decreases with the level of education and with the extent to which this education is oriented 
directly towards the labour market: The programmes work best for those who dropped out of 
the general track that prepares for university and work less well for those who drop out or 
complete a vocational or technical schooling track. Interestingly, in contrast to previous find-
ings, heterogeneity in these dimensions is not only present during the lock-in phase, but also in 
the post-treatment phase. Nevertheless, overall heterogeneity is more prevalent in the lock-in 
phase and is present also in other dimensions such as age, unemployment duration and past 
unemployment experience. This follows from the fact that during the lock-in phase the implicit 
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costs of participating in a programme, i.e. not searching for a job, are generally lower for those 
who are less likely to find a job anyway.2F2 
Finally, we study to which extent the Flemish PES could improve the effectiveness of 
their training component of the ALMP by changing the allocation of programme participants 
according to the individualized effectiveness of these programmes. We consider two main sce-
narios: one in which we impose no capacity constraints, so that an unlimited number of unem-
ployed could be allocated to programmes, and one in which the capacity of the programmes 
was fixed to the observed level. In the first case, changing the allocation could increase the time 
spent in employment by about 3.3 months. In the second scenario the overall gain is limited, 
i.e. only about 9 days for all, essentially because the capacity of the programmes is too small to 
have a large impact on overall employment. However, the small population of participants 
would gain substantially, namely about 5 months within a 30-month window. Using simpler 
allocation rules based on employability or past unemployment histories also leads to gain, but 
they reduce to about half of the gains of the optimal allocation. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we describe the institu-
tional setting and the data that are used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the econometric 
methods. Section 5 presents the results with a focus on the analysis of effect heterogeneity. 
Section 6 simulates several alternative assignment rules. It is followed by some robustness anal-
ysis and concluding remarks. 
2 The institutional setting 
Belgium is a federal state in which many competences have been decentralized. Gener-
ally, location-based matters, such as employment policies, are decentralized to the three regions 
                                                                
2  This fact also explains the result in Knaus et al. (2017) who find larger effects of job search programs for foreigners, but 
only during the lock-in phase. 
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(Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) and language-based matters, such as education, to the three 
communities (the Flemish, French and the small German one). National defence, justice and 
Social Security are typical competences that remained at the federal level. The rules and pay-
ment of unemployment insurance (UI) are thus determined at the federal level. The Regional 
Public Employment Services (PES) oversee job search assistance, intermediation services and 
the provision of active labour market policies for the unemployed. While the monitoring and 
the associated sanctioning of labour market availability and job search effort were until the end 
of 2015 executed by the federal unemployment agency (RVA/ONEM), based on information 
transmission by the regional PES, these tasks have been transferred to the regional PES since 
2016 (in Brussels since 2017).  
In general, in Belgium an unemployed worker who is seeking employment is entitled to 
non-means tested unemployment benefits (UB) in two cases. First, graduates from high school 
or higher education who are younger than 25 can start claiming benefits one year after gradua-
tion if they have been continuously searching for a job, but did not find one in this period. 
Second, workers are eligible for UB after involuntary lay-off to the extent that they have suffi-
ciently contributed to the UI. This is the scheme on which we focus in this paper. Unlike in 
other countries, the benefits are paid out without time limit. Laid-off workers the UB is related 
to prior earnings, but bracketed by a cap and a floor. The replacement rate is initially 65% (with 
a maximum of €1,736/month), but declines with unemployment duration. It reduces to 60% 
after 3 months, and then further after one year, depending on the status within the household 
and prior work experience. After 4 years all UBs attain the minimum which depends on the 
household status: €1,316/month for heads of household, €1,078/month for singles, and €561 for 
dependents, before taxes.3F3  
                                                                
3  Amounts for July 2019 (https://www.rva.be/nl/documentatie/infoblad/t67).  
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The regional PES provides employment services to unemployed and checks their availa-
bility for the labour market, already to some extent before the 2016 reform, and fully afterwards.  
Workers younger than 55 should be both passively and actively available for the labour market. 
Being (passively) available means that these workers should register as job seeker, show up at 
meetings convoked by PES counsellors and at job interviews with employers, and accept “suit-
able” job offers, programme participation and counselling. Being actively available means that 
they should be seeking a job. In Flanders passive availability was monitored more intensively 
than active availability, both before and after the 2016 reform. However, both forms of moni-
toring can be characterised as relatively “loose” from an international perspective 
(Langenbucher, 2015). 
 An unemployed worker who registers at the regional PES in Flanders (VDAB) is invited 
to an intake meeting or phone call with a counsellor.  At this intake meeting information is 
provided with respect to the rights and duties. In the period of analysis, the computer system of 
the PES informed the caseworker whether the unemployed job seeker should subsequently be 
invited for a new meeting. During these meetings the caseworker determines whether the un-
employed worker is in need of services of the PES. Amongst them, there are variety of active 
labour market policies (ALMP), such as orientation training (OT) - helping job seekers in iden-
tifying the professions to aim at - vocational training (VT) - learning specific competences 
required in certain professions - language training (DLT) - Dutch for foreigners -,  on-the-job 
training (OJT), or intensive counselling scheme (IC). In the next section we explain which pro-
grammes were retained for the analysis and why. 
Internationally comparable statistics on the importance of ALMP are not available at the 
regional level, but expenditures in Belgium are not very different from a typical OECD country 
(see OECD.stat). Labour market services includes counselling and job search assistance. The 
combination of these services with training is therefore the best proxy in these statistics for the 
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ALMP provided by a PES. In 2016, the Belgian expenditures on these posts sum to 0.35% of 
GDP. This is somewhat higher than the OECD average of 0.25% and higher than the 0.30% for 
the neighbouring country, the Netherlands. The other neighbours, France, and Germany, spend 
more, respectively 0.54% and 0.55% of GDP.       
3 Data 3.1 Population of interest 
The data for the analysis is drawn from administrative files on all individuals who regis-
tered between January 1991 and February 2019 as unemployed job seeker at the Flemish PES. 
These files contain rich socio-demographic information, as well as individual employment and 
job search histories since 1991. From this database we select 148,942 individuals who started 
claiming UI after an involuntary lay-off between December 2014 and June 2016. We do not 
retain individuals who enter unemployment after June 2016 as to allow follow-up of partici-
pants for a sufficiently long period. Since we retained programmes that commenced up to 9 
months after the start of the unemployment spell and since the observation period ends in Sep-
tember 2019, labour market outcomes can be observed for up to 30 months after the programme 
start.  
We exclude school-leavers claiming UB (see Section 3) as well as individuals younger 
than 21. We also exclude workers with disabilities and those older than 55 at the start of the 
unemployment spell, because these groups may not need to be fully available for the labour 
market or may benefit from alternative policies. We also dropped individuals not living in Flan-
ders and those who died during the period of analysis. 73,582 individuals are retained after 
imposing these selection criteria. 
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3.2 Programmes 
Table 3.1 reports how this population is divided up into four subgroups: (1) 56,324 indi-
viduals who did not participate in any ALMP within the first nine months of unemployment, 
i.e. the not yet treated group (Sianesi, 2004); (2) 3,640 individuals who started within the first 
nine months an ALMP that is retained for the main analysis; (3) 13,618 individuals entered 
within the first nine months an ALMP not retained for the evaluation, because (i) the placebo 
tests suggested concerns about selection bias when evaluating intensive counselling, (ii) in 
Dutch language training almost only foreigners with limited language skills participated, so that 
too few comparison observations were available, (iii) on-the-job training is not comparable to 
the other ALMP, as it is assigned to individuals who have already found a job and (iv) other 
small ALMP could not be aggregated in meaningful groups sufficiently large for an empirical 
analysis, or they belonged to a category that lasted too long on average (10 months or more) for 
an evaluation of the medium run impacts within the 30 months observation period. 
Programme participants are classified according to the first programme they participate 
in. The programmes considered in the analysis are the following. First, we distinguish between 
short- (less than 6 months, 3.8 months on average) and long (more than 6 and less than 10 
months, 7.8 months on average) vocational training programmes (SVT and LVT). Very long 
vocational training programmes, lasting 10 months or more, were reclassified into other ALMP, 
and subsequently dropped from the analysis as to ensure a sufficiently long follow-up. Since 
no information on planned duration is available, the duration of vocational training (VT) is 
determined based on the average realized duration in the corresponding sector.  
Third, orientation training (OT) aims at helping to determine a clear professional goal. 
This programme is relatively short. It lasts on average only about one month. However, within 
three months after the end 45% percent of the participants enter another ALMP, presumably to 
support the orientation that they have chosen.   
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Table 3.1: Importance of ALMP by type for entry cohorts in unemployment between 
December 2014 and June 2016 
Type of assistance and ALMP Average 
programme 
duration (months) 
Number of 
individuals 
Fraction 
No ALMP participation within first 9 months (NOP)1  - 56,324 76.5% 
ALMP within first 9 months retained in main analysis  3,640 4.9% 
1. Short (< 6 months) vocational training (SVT)2 3.83 1,305 1.8% 
2. Long (< 10 months) vocational training (LVT)2 7.18 1,220 1.7% 
3. Orientation training (OT) 1.05 1,115 1.5% 
ALMP within first 9 months excluded from analysis  13,618 18.5% 
1. Intensive counselling (IC) - 4 3,695 5.0% 
2. Dutch language training (DLT) 2.56 991 1.3% 
3. On-the-job training (OJT) - 2,045 2.8% 
4. Other ALMP, including very long VT2,3 - 6,887 9.4% 
Total  73,582 100.0% 
Note:  Individuals aged between 21 and 55 years at registration who started claiming an UI benefit after lay-off in the pe-
riod December 2014-June 2016. The following individuals were excluded: (i) those not living in Flanders; (ii) those 
with some disability; (iii) those who died during the period of analysis;  
1 This group may enter programmes beyond the first 9 months. 
2 No information on planned duration available. Duration of vocational training (VT) is determined as average real-
ized duration in the corresponding sector. Since the number of VT in some sectors was too small, some of them 
were aggregated. Eventually, 31 sectors are distinguished, all containing at least 19 individuals.  
3 This group contains various types of small, heterogeneous ALMP as well as 1,492 individuals who participated in 
vocational training lasting 10 months or more. 
4 The administrative files only record the administrative end of the contract as determined by the service provider to 
which the IC is contracted out. The duration of the service provision is not known, but must be less than the con-
tract duration which lasts 8.82 months on average.  
The dataset contains 45 ordered and 9 categorical conditioning variables (with 3 to 44 
unordered categories). All time-varying variables are measured at the start of the unemployment 
spell. Taking into account that categorical variables are transformed into dummy variables in a 
regression-type setting,4F4 this would correspond with 175 variables in a regression framework 
and many more if one aims at avoiding parametric restrictions by the inclusion of interaction 
and higher order terms for which the MCF will automatically account for.  
These conditioning variables provide information about personal socio-demographic 
characteristics, labour market history, including sickness, within the preceding 2, 5 and 10 
years, the ALMP participation history during previous unemployment spells, information about 
the job seeker’s job preferences and the corresponding professional experience, the calendar 
                                                                
4  This recoding is not needed for the MCF as it treats categorical variables directly, like Random Forests (as in Chou 1991; 
Hastie et al. 2009/2013, p. 310).  
11  
month in which unemployment was entered (19 indicators) and the day at which the ALMP 
started (or was predicted to start in case of no participation)5F5 in the unemployment spell (max-
imum 274 days). 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for a selected set of conditioning variables (panel A) 
and outcomes (panel B): the sample means by programme status and the standardized differ-
ences (in %) of for each programme status (SVT, LVT, OT) relative to the NOP group that did 
not participate in any ALMP within the first 9 months of the unemployment spell. A full de-
scription of all explanatory variables and the corresponding statistics can be found in Appendix 
A. The standardized differences are often larger than 20%, a number that Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985) consider ‘large’. This signals that the conditioning variables of participants in ALMP 
are very unbalanced relative to the NOP group and that controlling for selection bias is crucial 
in this setting.  
Table 3.2: Means and standardized differences for selected variables  
Variable No ALMP 
participation 
(NOP) 
Short 
vocational 
training (SVT) 
Long 
vocational 
training (LVT) 
Orientation 
training (OT) 
A. Conditioning variables Sample mean (standardized difference*100 relative to NOP)1 
Woman 0.49  0.31  (36) 0.40  (16) 0.46  (3) 
Age (in years) 35  34 (12) 34  (12) 34  (16) 
Proficiency in Dutch (0-3)2 2.4  2.5  (8) 2.7  (40) 2.6  (27) 
Months unemployed in last 10 years 18  19  (5) 16  (11) 17 (4) 
Months unemployed in last 2 years 3.9  3.8 (2) 3.0 (18) 3.2 (14) 
Education level (1 to 13) 7.2  5.9 (38) 7.9 (22) 7.2 (1) 
B. Outcomes  
# of months employed 10 months after start ALMP3 4.0  3.9 (2) 2.8 (33) 2.4 (45) 
# of months employed 20 months after start ALMP3 9.8  11 (16) 9.4 (5) 7.8 (27) 
# of months employed 30 months after start ALMP3 16  18 (24) 17 (11) 15 (12) 
Number of observations 59964 1305 1220 1115 
Notes:  1 The standardized difference is defined as �?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 − ?̅?𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁� �[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)] 2⁄� ∗  100 , where ?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗  and 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) are the sample mean and variance of the variable 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  for 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼}.  
2 Proficiency in Dutch = 0 if no knowledge; = 1 if limited; = 2 if good; =3 if very good.  
3 For non-participants in ALMP (NOP) the date at which the ALMP starts is predicted (See Section 4.4). 
We observe that there are many more men than women participating in vocational train-
ing. Participants in vocational training are somewhat more proficient in Dutch, especially those 
                                                                
5 More on this in Section 4.4. 
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in LVT. Participants in SVT have comparable unemployment experience as non-participants, 
while those in LVT have clearly been less unemployed both in the last 2 and 10 years. Partici-
pants in SVT are less educated than non-participants, while those in LVT are on average more 
educated.  
Participants in orientation training are much more likely to have a good knowledge of 
Dutch. Moreover, they have been on average much less unemployed in the last two years. They 
are more likely to have a medium level of education. This profile seems to match therefore the 
profile of a medium skilled worker who has been employed in a routine job and has been dis-
placed in the gradual tendency of more polarization of the labour market (see e.g. Autor et al. 
2003; Goos et al. 2009). These workers typically require to be re-oriented to another profession, 
because they typically have skills that are no longer in demand. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for three main outcome variables, 
namely cumulative number of months that a worker is employed 10, 20 and 30 months after the 
start of the ALMP. In the empirical part, the last one and additional outcome variables will be 
considered. Since participation in ALMP can last up to 10 months on average (for long VT), 
the effects after 10 months measure lock-in effects for some programmes, while after 30 months 
the post-program effect, if present, adds to this lock-in effect.  
It can be deduced from panel B of Table 3.2 that the outcomes vary substantially by pro-
gramme status. However, in view of the important variability of the conditioning variables 
(panel A) these descriptive statistics are not necessarily informative about causal average pro-
gramme effects due to possible selection biases. How to draw inference about the effects of 
these programmes is discussed in next section. 
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4 Econometrics 4.1 The causal modelling framework and the parameters of interest 
 We use Rubin’s (1974) potential outcome language to describe a multiple treatment 
model under unconfoundedness, or conditional independence (Imbens, 2000, Lechner, 2001). 
Let D denote the treatment, which is non-participation and participation in one of the three 
programmes in our case. Thus, it takes on four different integer values from 0 to 3. The (poten-
tial) outcome of interest that realises under treatment d is denoted by Yd. For each individual, 
we observe only the particular potential outcome related to the treatment status that the individ-
ual has chosen, 
5
0
1( ) di i i
d
y d d y
=
= =∑  ( 1( )⋅  denotes the indicator function, which is one if its ar-
gument is true and zero otherwise).6F6 There are two groups of variables to condition on, X  and 
Z. X  contains those covariates that are needed to correct for selection bias (confounders), while 
Z contains variables that define (groups of) population members for which an average causal 
effect estimate is desired. For identification, X  and Z may be discrete, continuous, or both, but 
for estimation, we will consider discrete Z only. They may overlap in any way. In line with the 
machine learning literature, we call them ‘features’ from now on. Denote the union of the two 
groups of variables by X, { }, , dim( )X X Z X p= = . 
Below, we investigate the following average causal effects: 
( , ; , ) ( | , )m lIATE m l x E Y Y X x D∆ = − = ∈∆  , 
| ,( , ; , ) ( | , ) ( , ; , ) ( )
m l
X Z z DGATE m l z E Y Y Z z D IATE m l x f x dx= ∈∆∆ = − = ∈∆ = ∆∫ , 
|( , ; ) ( | ) ( , ; , ) ( )
m l
X DATE m l E Y Y D IATE m l x f x dx∈∆∆ = − ∈∆ = ∆∫ . 
                                                                
6  If not obvious otherwise, capital letters denote random variables, and small letter their values. Small values subscripted by 
‘i’ denote the value of the respective variable of individual ‘i’. 
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The Individualized Average Treatment Effects (IATEs), ( , ; , )IATE m l x ∆ , measure the 
mean impact of treatment m compared to treatment l for units with features x that belong to 
treatment groups Δ, where Δ denotes all treatments of interest. The IATEs represent the causal 
parameters at the finest aggregation level of the features available. On the other extreme, the 
Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) represent the population averages. If Δ relates to the popu-
lation with D=m, then this is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) for treat-
ment m. The ATE and ATET are the classical parameters investigated in many econometric 
causal studies. The Group Average Treatment Effect (GATE) parameters are in between those 
two extremes with respect to their aggregation levels. The analyst preselects the variables Z 
prior to estimation according to her policy interest. The IATEs and the GATEs are special cases 
of the so-called Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs). 
4.2 Identification 
The classical set of unconfoundedness assumptions consists of the following parts (see 
Imbens, 2000, Lechner 2001): 
0 1 2 3
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The conditional independence assumption (CIA) implies that there are no features other 
than X that jointly influence treatment and potential outcomes (for the values of X that are in 
the support of interest, χ ). The common support (CS) assumption stipulates that for each value 
in χ , there must be the possibility to observe all treatments. The stable-unit-treatment-value 
assumption (SUTVA) implies that the observed value of the treatment does not depend on the 
treatment allocation of the other population members (ruling out spillover and treatment size 
effects). Usually, to have an interesting interpretation of the effects, it is required that X is not 
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influenced by the treatment (exogeneity). If this set of assumption holds, then all IATEs are 
identified: 
( , ; , ) ( | , )
( | )
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m l
m l
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Note that IATE does not depend on the conditioning treatment set, Δ. Since the distribu-
tions used for aggregation, | , ( )X Z z Df x= ∈∆  and | ( )X Df x∈∆ , relate to observable variables (X, Z, D) 
only, they are identified as well (under standard regularity conditions). This in turn implies that 
the GATE and ATE parameters are identified (their dependence on Δ remains, if the distribution 
of the features depends on Δ).  
It is of course important that these conditions are plausible in our study. Let us consider 
them in turn. In Section 3 we already argued that availability of a wide range of socio-demo-
graphic information and of rich information about the labour market history of individuals en-
hances the plausibility of the CIA. These are essentially the variables identified by other eval-
uation studies as the most important confounders (e.g. Heckman et al., 1998; Lechner and Wun-
sch, 2013). These are also the variables available to the caseworker during the interview and 
thus should be the ones she is mainly basing her decision on. Advantages of our study compared 
to the training programme evaluation literature are the availability of sickness absence records 
as well as the unemployment rate in the district of residence. Probably the biggest disadvantage 
is the lack of earnings histories. However, this may not be so important as earnings are not an 
outcome variable (and thus earnings records are not needed for the role of pre-treatment out-
comes) as well as because proxies for earnings are available, such as education, nationality, the 
sector of the previous jobs, the duration of the preceding employment spell, and the preferred 
desired profession of the job seeker. Overall, we conclude that CIA may be plausible. However, 
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as a safeguard against possible violations we report a placebo study (that does not indicate any 
violations) below.  
SUTVA is plausibly fulfilled as all programmes considered are rather small compared the 
labour force. Common support is a condition that can be checked in the data.  We did not detect 
any common support problems with the programmes finally investigated. Finally, the exogene-
ity of confounding and heterogeneity variables is ensured by measuring all time varying varia-
bles at the beginning of the unemployment spell. At that moment, the individual did not know 
if and when she will enter a training programme. 
4.3 Estimation  
In this paper, we utilize the recently upcoming causal machine learning literature (see 
Athey 2019, and Athey and Imbens, 2019, for overviews). It combines the prediction power of 
the machine and statistical learning literature (for an overview see, e.g., Hastie, Tibshirani, and 
Friedman, 2009) with the microeconometric literature on defining and identifying causal effects 
(e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Recently, this literature has seen a surge of proposed 
methods, in particular in epidemiology and econometrics. Knaus, Lechner, and Strittmatter 
(2018) compare many of those methods systematically with respect to their set-up as well as 
their performance in a simulation exercise. One conclusion from their paper is that random 
forest-based estimation approaches outperform alternative estimators.  
The starting point of the causal forest literature is the causal tree introduced in a paper by 
Athey and Imbens (2016). In a causal tree, the sample is splitted sequentially into smaller and 
smaller strata, in which the values of X become increasingly homogenous, to mitigate selection 
effects and to uncover effect heterogeneity. Once the splitting is terminated based on some 
stopping criterion, the treatment effect is computed within each stratum (called a ‘leaf’) by 
computing the difference of the mean outcomes of treated and controls (possibly weighted by 
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the conditional on X probabilities of being a treated or control observation). However, the liter-
ature on regression trees acknowledges that the sample may be rather unstable because of its 
sequential nature (if the first split is different, the full tree will likely lead to different final 
strata). A solution to this problem is the so-called random forests estimator. Their key idea is 
to induce some randomness into the tree building process, build many trees, and then average 
the predictions of the many trees. The induced randomness is generated by using randomly 
generated subsamples (or bootstrap samples) and by considering for each splitting decision only 
a random selection of the covariates. Wager and Athey (2018) use this idea to propose causal 
forests, which are based on a collection of causal trees with small final leaves.7F7 Lechner (2018) 
develops these ideas further by improving on the splitting rule for the individual trees, and by 
providing methods to estimate heterogeneous effects for a limited number of discrete policy 
variables (Group Average Treatment Effects, GATE) at low computational costs, in addition 
to the highly disaggregated effects the literature focused on so far (Individualized Average 
Treatment Effects, IATE). Furthermore, Lechner (2018) suggests a way of performing unified 
inference for all aggregation levels. Finally, the approach is applicable to a multiple, discrete 
treatment framework. Since many of these advantages are important in the empirical analysis 
of this paper, this approach, termed Modified Causal Forests (MCF), is used below. For all 
further technical details of the estimator, the reader is referred to Lechner (2018).  
4.4 Practical implementation 4.4.1 Outcome and control variables 
We consider three types of outcome variables based on labour market history: employ-
ment, unemployment and a residual category which we call out-of-the-labour-force. It is de-
                                                                
7  Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager (2018) generalize this idea to many different econometric estimation problems. 
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fined as not being employed nor unemployed. These variables are either measured at a particu-
lar distance to the start of the programme, or in cumulated fashion as sum over a certain period. 
The control variables have already been discussed in the previous sections. A complete 
list of them including descriptive statistics is contained in Appendix A. It is of course interesting 
to understand which of the features are important in the estimation. In classical programme 
evaluation of average population effects, such information would be deduced from an estimated 
propensity score. For Random Forest type estimators, computing so-called variable importance 
measures are informative about the relevance of one variable given all the others. They are 
computed by comparing the values of the objective function (estimated with out-of-bag obser-
vations, i.e. out-of-sample) of a prediction using the full set of variables with a prediction were 
the values of a specific variable are randomly permutated (so that this permutated variable be-
comes uninformative). In our case, the most important variables consisted of the country of 
birth, language skills, the simulated start date, labour market history (past employment and 
unemployment over various horizons), region, and the sector of the last employment. It is how-
ever important to note that a variable importance test will pick variables are either relevant for 
selection bias, or effect heterogeneity, or both. Those two aspects cannot be separated in a var-
iable importance measure as they both determine the value of the objective function of the 
MCF. 
4.4.2 Differential programme starts 
Because individuals could be assigned to an ALMP at any point of time in their unem-
ployment spell (although usually they are assigned in the beginning), we face a dynamic as-
signment problem. In such an environment the assumption of no anticipation is required in 
addition to the CIA and the construction of an appropriate comparison group is complicated, as 
first acknowledged by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008). No anticipation means that individ-
uals do not alter their behaviour in response to a future assignment to the ALMP. Since in the 
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period of analysis the training capacity tended to exceed demand, the time between assignment 
and the actual programme start is short, so that the bias induced by the failure of this assumption 
is likely to be small.  
To transform a dynamic programme assignment into a static one, non-participants are 
defined to be the population that did not participate in the programme within a certain period, 
such as the first 9 months in this paper. Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) explain that such a 
definition biases the estimation of the effects upwards, as nonparticipants are less likely to have 
entered a programme, because they may have already found a job. To avoid this bias, they 
propose to define the comparison group as those that have not yet been treated. Based on these 
insight, two strands have developed in the literature. A first strand, aims at identifying the ef-
fects of those who did not yet receive a treatment (e.g. Sianesi 2004, 2008 and Biewen, Fitzen-
berger, Osikominu and Paul 2014). A disadvantage of this approach is that it redefines the effect 
and makes it dependent on the fraction of nonparticipants that participate (shortly) after this 
period.8F8 Another strand of the literature therefore aims at identifying the effect relative to never 
receiving the treatment. This is essentially done by right censoring nonparticipants who subse-
quently enter the programme. Fredriksson and Johanson (2008) assume independent right cen-
soring, while Crépon, Ferracci, Jolivet and van den Berg (2009) and Vikström (2017) generalize 
this by allowing for selective right censoring. Van den Berg and Vikström (2019) consider long-
run post-treatment effects, such as those of vocational programmes on earnings. 
Identifying the effects relative to never receiving the treatment with CML methods is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we follow the first strand in this literature. We essentially 
follow the approach proposed by Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2011), which adapts the one 
suggested by Lechner (1999, 2002) to accommodate for the critique of Fredriksson and Johans-
                                                                
8  In our empirical application about 25% of the nonparticipants enter an ALMP between 10 and 30 months after the beginning 
of the unemployment spell. 
20  
son (2008). Instead of regressing the log of the elapsed time to programme start within the 
unemployment spells of participants on a selection of the available explanatory variables that 
seem important for the timing of the programme, we use a post-LASSO estimator (i.e. OLS 
with the variables selected by LASSO estimation) to determine the relevant variables and the 
coefficients of this regression. We then use the estimated coefficients together with a draw from 
the residual distribution to predict the ‘pseudo’ programme starts for nonparticipants. Thus, the 
underlying assumption is that the assignment of programme start dates is random conditional 
on the variables included in the post-LASSO procedure. We exclude those nonparticipants for 
whom this simulated start date lies outside the 9-month treatment window and – to accommo-
date for the critique – those who are no longer unemployed at the assigned start date. The details 
of the determination of the pseudo programme starts can be found in Appendix B.              
5 Results 
In this section, we report the main results. We start by considering the average population 
effects for several outcomes of policy importance and their development over time. This in-
forms us about the overall effectiveness of the different programmes and the dynamics of the 
effects. Next, we investigate whether the average population effects (ATE) differ from the ef-
fects of those unemployed workers in a particular programme (ATET). These comparisons are 
informative to understand the effects of caseworkers’ selection to some extent. If caseworkers 
select programmes that are most effective for their specific unemployed, then ATET should be 
larger than ATE. 
Then, for the arguably most important short- and medium-run outcome, namely employ-
ment, we investigate more thoroughly the heterogeneities with respect to the programmes and 
groups of unemployed by their programme participation. Subsequently, the heterogeneity of 
the most policy relevant medium-run effects are investigated with respect to a few variables 
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considered to be of importance for the policy. Finally, in the last subsection we present an 
analysis of the IATEs, i.e. the effect estimates at the finest possible level of granularity. 
5.1 Average population effects 5.1.1 Dynamics and programme heterogeneity 
In this section, we report the average population effects (ATE) of the different pro-
grammes in comparison with no ALMP participation (NOP) and with each other.  
Figure 5.1: The time evolution of the ATEs of the medium-run employment outcome 
 
Note: Effects for month 1 are interpolated. 
Figure 5.1 reports the dynamic evolution effects of the different programmes in compar-
ison with no ALMP participation (NOP) on the probability to be employed.9F9 Participation in 
short-term vocational training (SVT) modestly decreases the probability to be employed only 
during the first four months by a maximum of 8 percentage points (pp) relative to the counter-
                                                                
9  Standard errors and confidence intervals are omitted for clarity of presentation. All effects have a standard error of about 
2.3-2.5 percentage points after month 20. 
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factual of NOP. Thereafter, the gain in employment is positive. The lock-in effect lasts about 
as long as the average programme duration of 3.8 months, which suggests that programme par-
ticipation increases job-finding rates rapidly after the end of the programme. Subsequently, the 
ATE on the employment probability continues to rise until about 12 months after the pro-
gramme start. Thereafter it stabilizes to around 15 pp, which is a substantial effect (statistically 
well determined), in particular if it remains stable over time as might be conjectured from its 
dynamic pattern. 
Participation in long-term vocational training (LVT) leads to an employment probability 
which falls much more sharply during the first two months, reducing it up to 18 pp relative to 
the counterfactual of NOP. This follows naturally from the longer programme duration (7.2 
months on average), but the lock-in period lasts even longer, until about one year after the 
programme start. The eventual impact of programme participation is of a similar magnitude as 
of SVT, i.e. around 15 pp., but it is only attained after about 20 months. This means that the 
longer time investment in human capital accumulation is not reflected in higher employment 
chances. It is possible that the higher time investment of LVT results in higher productivity 
and/or wage effects, but due to data unavailability this could not be tested. Thus, on average it 
appears that SVT dominates LVT as its courses are cheaper and its indirect costs (lock-in pe-
riod) are lower as well.  
The negative effects during the lock-in period of orientation training (OT) are even more 
pronounced as the effect in terms of the employment probability declines even to minus 21 pp, 
it takes 17 months before it becomes positive. This long lock-in effect is presumably related to 
45% of OT participants entering other programmes within 3 months after completing OT. OT 
(including its follow-up programmes) is however also less effective in the medium run as its 
effect stabilizes around 5 pp, 10 pp below the level of VT. In conclusion, on average, SVT 
dominates LVT in terms of effectiveness, which in turn dominates OT.     
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Next, to get a better overall picture of the effects, we investigate (i) three summary 
measures of the employment effects (summed up over the first and last 9 months as well as over 
all 30 month), and (ii) two alternative outcome measure (months in unemployment, months out-
of-the-labour-force).  
Table 5.1: Effects for the different programmes 30 months after programme start on cumula-
tive months in employment, unemployment and out of the labour force (ATE) 
 No ALMP 
participation (NOP) 
Short vocational 
training (SVT) 
Long vocational 
training (LVT) 
Orientation training 
(OT) 
Cumulative months in employment 9 months after programme start 
NOP 3.5 (0.0)    
SVT 0.1 (0.2) 3.6 (0.2)   
LVT -1.1 (0.1) *** -1.2 (0.2) *** 2.4 (0.1)  
OT -1.6 (0.1) *** -1.6 (0.2) *** -0.4 (0.2) ** 6.2 (0.2) 
Cumulative months in employment between month 22 and month 30 month after programme start 
NOP 5.7 (0.0)    
SVT 1.4 (0.2) *** 7.1 (0.2)   
LVT 1.3 (0.2) *** -0.1 (0.3)   7.0 (0.2)  
OT 0.4 (0.2) ** -0.9 (0.3) *** -0.8 (0.3) *** 6.2 (0.2) 
Cumulative months in employment 30 months after programme start 
NOP 16.0 (0.1)    
SVT 3.4 (0.5) *** 19.4 (0.5)   
LVT 1.0 (0.5) ** -2.4 (0.7) *** 17.1 (0.5)  
OT -1.4 (0.5) *** -4.8 (0.7) *** -2.4 (0.7) *** 14.7 (0.5) 
Cumulative months in unemployment 30 months after programme start 
NOP 10.9 (0.1)    
SVT -1.9 (0.4) *** 9.0 (0.3)   
LVT 0.9 (0.4) ** 2.8 (0.5) *** 11.8 (0.4)  
OT 2.7 (0.5) *** 4.5 (0.6) *** 1.8 (0.6) *** 13.6 (0.5) 
Cumulative months out-of-the-labour force 30 months after programme start 
NOP 3.1 (0.1)    
SVT -1.6 (0.3) *** 1.6 (0.3)   
LVT -1.8 (0.3) *** -0.4 (0.3) 1.1 (0.3)  
OT -1.4 (0.3) *** 0.2 (0.4) 0.7 (0.4) 1.7 (0.2) 
Note:  Outcomes measured in months. Level of potential outcome for the specific programme on main diagonal in bold. 
All effects are population averages (ATE). Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate the precision of the 
estimate by showing whether the p-value of a two-sided significance test is below 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.  
The first panel of Table 5.1 shows that after 9 months SVT leads to the same number of 
months employment as NOP (3.5), while LVT and OT lead to substantial average losses of 1.1 
and 1.6 months respectively. The cumulative effects in the last 9 months of the observation 
window (month 22 to 30) are all positive. They are largest and similar for SVT and LVT (1.3-
1.4) and about one third of their magnitude for OT (0.4). These statistically well determined 
results are also confirmed when comparing the effects of the different programmes directly with 
each other. The third panel is summarizing these employment effects over all 30 months. While 
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SVT (3.4) and LVT (1.0) have positive effects, the effect OT is negative (-1.4) due to its large 
lock-in component. The last two panels of Table 5.1 report the average total impact of the 
different programmes on the time spent in unemployment (UE) and out-of-the-labour force 
(OLF) 30 months after the programme start. While all programmes reduce time in OLF by 
about one and a half month, only SVT decreases the time in UE as well (by 1.9 months). LVT 
increase UE by almost 1 month, while OT increases time in UE by almost 3 months. Again, 
these are at least partly repercussions of the differential lock-in effects.  
These findings can be rationalized with ideas in both the economic and psychological 
literature. First, from an economic perspective we expect that participation in training reinforces 
labour force participation if the option value of participation is eventually positive, which is 
consistent with the findings reported in Figure 5.1. Furthermore, participating in training helps 
workers setting clearer professional targets, because counsellors typically have such targets in 
mind when assigning them to training programmes. The psychological literature typically finds 
that goal setting leads to more time and effort spent on job search (see e.g. van Hooft and Noor-
dzij, 2009; Latham et al. 2018).   
5.1.2 Programme group heterogeneity 
While in Table 5.1 we investigated all effects for the population of unemployed, now we 
analyse how the effects differ for the different populations participating in the different pro-
grammes. One motivation for this perspective is that if caseworkers assign programmes accord-
ing to their individual effectiveness, then we expect the effects for their own population (e.g. 
the effects of SVT for those participating in SVT) to be the largest. The detailed results in Table 
C.1 in Appendix C clearly show that this is not the case. In Table 5.2, we show formal statistical 
(Wald-) tests for the equality of the effects over the four populations. We see that out of 30 tests 
there is only one clear rejection, which is of course expected at conventional significance levels. 
However, the reason for this rejection is that the ATET is worse than the ATE. 
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Table 5.2: Wald test of equality of effects in all four treatment specific subpopulations 
Outcome variable SVT – 
NOP 
LVT – 
NOP 
OT – 
NOP 
LVT – 
SVT 
OT – 
SVT 
OT – 
LVT 
Cumulative months in employment 0-9 months after … 3.6 6.1 16.5*** 0.7 1.6 2.7 
Cumulative months in employment 21-30 months after … 1.9 2.8 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.1 
Cumulative months in employment 0-30 months after … 3.2 3.2 2.5 0.6 0.4 0.1 
Cumulative months in unemployment 0-30 months after … 4.6 3.0 2.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Cumulative months in out-of-the-labour-force 0-30 months after  4.9 7.3* 6.7* 2.2 0.5 1.0 
Note: Under the null of equality, the test statistic is distributed as 2 (3)χ . 
This means that either the treatment effects are fairly homogeneous in these populations 
or that caseworkers’ assignment to the different programmes is close to random. Below we will 
show that effects are clearly heterogeneous, so that we can conclude that caseworkers fail to 
assign the unemployed to those programmes from which they would benefit most.10F10 In Section 
6 we discuss the gains that the PES could make by improving the assignments of unemployed 
to the different programmes. 
5.2 Heterogeneity with respect to policy relevant variables 
In many situations, there are heterogeneity variables a decision maker may particularly 
care about. In this section, we analyse such variables using the GATE parameter introduced 
above. We present the results for the overall population, as programme-population specific ef-
fects do not appear to deviate much from the population averages. We focus again on the main 
medium-term outcome: the cumulative number of months employed 30 months after the pro-
gramme start. Of course, specifying a long list of policy relevant variables a priori and reporting 
significant results bears the danger of data-snooping. Here, we assume that the Flemish labour 
market authorities consider the following variables as particularly important: Unemployment 
history (last 2 and 10 years), unemployment duration at the start of the programme (below or 
above the median), age (younger than 25 or older than 50, below or above the median), sex, 
                                                                
10  This appears to be in line with official policy. The PES in Flanders used outflow targets for evaluating caseworkers, like 
70% of the participants must be employed within 6 months after the end of the training" instead of effect targets. 
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proficiency in Dutch language (4 point Likert scale/below highest proficiency level), unem-
ployment rate in the district of residence at the start of the unemployment spell, country of birth 
(6 groups: Belgium, Southern EU countries, Eastern EU countries, other EU countries, Turkey 
or Morocco, rest of the world) , and 13 education levels (from second year of high school or 
below to master’s degree).  
Remember that we have sampled individuals who entered unemployment after being laid-
off from a job. Recent unemployment history helps therefore identifying a population that is 
more loosely attached to the labour market in the sense that it can identify individuals who did 
not only experience employment in the past two years, but also some time in unemployment. 
From a policy perspective it could be interesting to identify programmes that work for such a 
population. A priori one could expect that the provision of vocational training may strengthen 
the competencies of this group and may accomplish more stable employment. It can, however, 
be useful to verify whether this hypothesis holds. This empirical evaluation based on a machine 
learning approach can help checking this and other hypotheses as the ones formulated below. 
By contrast, long-term unemployment histories can, for instance, help identifying a group of 
workers who had stable employment (by having little unemployment experience in the last 10 
years), but who lost their job abruptly. This might be the group to which OT is targeted and it 
is of interest of knowing whether such a strategy works. In Belgium youth and older workers 
have difficulties in finding jobs, so that it is of interest to know which policies are effective for 
those younger than 25 or older than 50. Discrimination both in terms of gender and migration 
background (country of birth and proficiency in Dutch are proxies for this) is a very sensitive 
political issue in Flanders and in Belgium individuals with migration background have much 
more difficulty than elsewhere in the EU to find employment. Identifying which policies work 
best for containing such discrimination and for getting migrants to stable employment is there-
fore highly relevant. In the Belgian labour market low educated workers are particularly at risk 
of unemployment, so that knowledge about the relative effectiveness of policies according to 
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the level of education of participants is valuable. Despite Flanders being a small region, unem-
ployment rates vary substantially across districts. This is related to the limited geographic mo-
bility within the region, induced, amongst others, by a policy that heavily supports home own-
ership and that stimulates traffic congestion. Finally, the effectiveness of training programmes 
according to the unemployment duration at which they start relates to the discussion of whether 
preventive or curative interventions are more effective.  
Figure 5.2: Difference of GATEs to ATE of SVT relative to NOP for the four proficiency 
levels in Dutch – Cumulative number of months employed 30 months after programme start 
 
Note: Dutch proficiency varies between no proficiency (0) and native proficiency (3). The boxes indicate the 65% con-
fidence intervals around the GATEs, while the ends of the whiskers mark the widths of the 90% confidence 
intervals. The vertical axis measures the deviation of the GATE from the ATE. 
When we test for univariate treatment heterogeneity of the ATEs on the cumulative num-
ber of months employed 30 months after programme start, we find statistically significant dif-
ferences at the 10% level in four dimensions (proficiency in Dutch, country of birth and level 
of education), but not for all three programmes. Figure 5.2 illustrates the difference of the 
GATEs (minus ATE) of SVT relative to NOP associated to the four proficiency levels by means 
of box-and-whisker plots. The horizontal line at zero indicates the level of the ATE. One can 
clearly observe a decrease in the GATEs with the proficiency level in Dutch and that the lower 
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proficiency levels have significantly higher GATEs than the ATE. For instance, the GATE of 
those with no knowledge of Dutch is 3.7 months higher than the ATE (p-value of 2%). 
Figure 5.3 reports the corresponding GATEs of OT versus NOP. Interestingly, the point 
estimates of the GATEs for the two lowest proficiency levels are positive while the point esti-
mate of the ATE was negative. While these GATEs are not statistically significantly different 
from zero, they are statistically significantly different from the ATE, at the 3% level for profi-
ciency level zero and at the 8% level for proficiency level one. The point estimates of the 
GATEs of LVT versus NOP also display a similar negative relationship with Dutch proficiency 
as reported for the other programme participations. However, none of these differences are sig-
nificantly different from the ATE. We therefore do not display the corresponding figure.  
Figure 5.3: Difference of GATEs to ATE of OT relative to NOP for the four proficiency levels 
in Dutch – Cumulative number of months employed 30 months after programme start 
 
Note: Dutch proficiency varies between no proficiency (0) and native proficiency (3). The boxes indicate the 65% confi-
dence intervals around the GATEs, while the ends of the whiskers mark the widths of the 90% confidence intervals. 
The vertical axis measures the deviation of the GATE from the ATE. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates how the GATEs vary by country of birth. This suggests that the 
GATEs of SVT relative to NOP are the highest for individuals born in Southern European Un-
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ion countries (6.8 months). It is notable that the effects for those born in Turkey and Morocco, 
i.e. for whom the employment rates are lower than for other foreigners, but they remain signif-
icantly higher (5.1 months) than for Belgians (2.5 months). Even if the precision is lower and 
we do not find statistically significant differences when considering the other ALMP, the pat-
tern of the corresponding GATEs is similar and, hence, not reported. As additional evidence, 
we just compared the GATEs for being born in Belgium or not. For participants in SVT born 
outside of Belgium the GATE of SVT relative to NOP is 5.8 months compared to 2.1 months 
for those born in Belgium (p-value of 5%). Together with the previous finding this strongly 
suggests that SVT is more effective for migrants who recently migrated to Belgium.  
Figure 5.4: Difference of GATEs to ATE of SVT relative to NOP according to country of birth 
– Cumulative number of months employed 30 months after programme start 
  
Note: Country of birth on horizontal axes. Vertical axes denotes difference of respective GATE with ATE. The boxes indi-
cate the 65% confidence intervals around GATE-ATE, while the ends of the whiskers mark the widths of the 90% 
confidence intervals. The vertical axis measures the deviation of the GATE from the ATE.  
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Figure 5.5: Difference of GATEs to ATE of SVT relative to NOP according to educational 
achievement – Cumulative number of months employed 30 months after programme start 
 
Note:  Final education level on horizontal axes. Vertical axes denotes difference of respective GATE with ATE. The boxes 
indicate the 65% confidence intervals around GATE-ATE, while the ends of the whiskers mark the widths of the 
90% confidence intervals. The vertical axis measures the deviation of the GATE from the ATE. 
Figure 5.5 displays the GATEs (minus ATE) of SVT relative to NOP for the 13 levels of 
education levels that we distinguish.11F11 The highest effects are found for general education at 
different levels, but among these the GATEs are higher for lower levels of education, i.e., in 
decreasing order, for first stage high school drop outs who at most successfully completed the 
first qualification stage in high school (attained after the second out of six high school years), 
second stage high school drop outs in the general track who at most successfully completed 
the second qualification stage in high school (after four high school years), academic bachelor’s 
degree and high school graduate in the general track.  The below average GATEs are found 
for master’s degree and, especially, for professional bachelor’s degree. A similar ranking is 
                                                                
11  Pupils can choose among four tracks in high school: (i) the general track provides a primarily theoretical general preparation 
for tertiary education; (ii) the technical track consists of a mix of theoretical and practical classes aimed at both direct labour 
market entry after completion and entry into primarily technical tertiary education; (iii) the vocational track teaches practical 
skills that prepare for particular professions; (iv) the arts track combines general education with active arts practice. The 
latter track is very small. In the analysis it is integrated in the general track.  
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found for the other programmes. Common to these results is that these programmes perform 
well for students who dropped out the educational process while they were following a general 
track without any practical professional orientation. This suggests that the vocational and ori-
entation programmes are more effective for these groups because they provide training in spe-
cific professional skills that are directly useful on the labour market which these groups are 
lacking. Conversely, such programmes are less useful for those who already have accomplished 
some professional education that is directly useful on the labour market, and more so, the higher 
is the level of education that has been accomplished. 
So far, we considered the GATEs for the cumulative number of months employed 2.5 
years after the programme start. The heterogeneity in the effects of this outcome mixes two 
sources of heterogeneity: one during the lock-in phase and one during the post-treatment period. 
In both the study of Knaus, Lechner and Strittmatter (2017) and Bertrand, Crépon, Marguerie 
and Premand (2017) effect heterogeneity is essentially found during the lock-in phase and not 
so much post treatment. In our evaluation we confirm that heterogeneity is more important 
during this initial phase, but also find evidence of heterogeneity in the post-treatment effect.  
During the lock-in phase TE heterogeneity is essentially caused by the differential speed 
at which different types of unemployed find employment in the potential state of NOP. So, 
generally this causes less negative programme effects for unemployed with a low employabil-
ity, because even without programme participation these individuals would have low chances 
to transit to a job. To obtain an idea of the effect heterogeneity during the lock-in phase, we 
consider the GATEs for the cumulative number of months employed 9 months after the pro-
gramme start. We do find evidence of heterogeneity in more dimensions than for the benchmark 
outcome. In addition to the aforementioned dimensions, all programmes are significantly less 
effective for youth below the age of 25 and more effective for older workers above age 50 with 
the effectiveness generally increasing with age, more effective for those living in a city, more 
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effective for longer term unemployed (except for SVT), less effective for those with a lot of 
unemployment experience in the last two years.    
To evaluate the heterogeneity in the post-treatment, we consider the cumulative employ-
ment outcome between months 22 and 30 after the programme start. This is when the pro-
gramme effects are in their long-run equilibrium (see Figure 5.1). In this case the heterogeneity 
remains in the following dimensions: higher effectiveness for those with lower level of Dutch 
proficiency, for those born in a foreign country, in particular those born in a Southern or Eastern 
EU country. For education the point estimates display similar differences as for the benchmark 
outcome, but they are no longer statistically significant.12F12 
5.3 Heterogeneity at the (averaged) individual level (IATEs) 
In this section, we present the results for the individualized average effects (IATEs), 
which present the finest level of granularity available. To avoid flooding the reader with num-
bers, we will concentrate on the cumulative medium-term employment outcomes for the com-
parison to NOP (no programme participation) which are likely to be the most policy relevant. 
We first describe the extent of heterogeneity in the programme effects. We then report the re-
sults of a post LASSO regression of the IATEs on the conditioning variables to detect system-
atic partial relationships between the former and the latter. Finally, we present the results of a 
k-means clustering analysis to get an informal characterization of sub-groups according to the 
effectiveness of programme participation.   
Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of the IATEs of SVT vs. NOP. 99% of the estimated 
effects are positive, have a mean of 3.4 month (as shown in Table 5.1) and a standard deviation 
of 2.2. With a median standard error of the estimates of the IATEs of about 2.1 about 34% of 
                                                                
12  Detailed results on lock-in as well as medium run heterogeneity are available on request from the authors. 
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the estimated IATEs are significantly different from zero. This points to two important issues: 
(i) There is considerable heterogeneity in the IATEs, some of which however is due to estima-
tion error; (ii) It is much more difficult to get a precise estimate (without imposing functional 
forms) for the IATEs than for the GATEs and ATE that were estimated with rather high preci-
sion. These features are also visible when considering Figure 5.7, in which the sorted effects 
are given together with a 90%-confidence interval based on the estimated standard errors (see 
also Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Luo 2018). Again, we see a substantial variation of the 
effects, but also that the uncertainty of the ATE is much lower than for the IATEs. 
Figure 5.6: Distribution of estimated IATE of SVT vs. NOP 
 
Note: Kernel smooth with Epanechnikov Kernel and Silverman (normality) bandwidth. 
The respective figures for the other programmes are like the ones presented and are 
moved to Appendix C.2. 
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Figure 5.7: Overall heterogeneity: sorted effects of SVT relative to NOP – Employment 30 
month after the programme start 
 
Note:  IATEs are sorted according their size. 90%-confidence interval based on estimated standard errors and normal 
distribution. Standard errors are smoothed by Nadaraya-Watson regression (Epanechnikov kernel with Silverman 
bandwidth). 
From the previous discussion of the GATEs and the distribution of the IATEs there is 
substantial effect heterogeneity. In the previous section we discussed to what extent this heter-
ogeneity is directly related to policy relevant variables. However, by considering the marginal 
effects of one variable at a time, some of the heterogeneity may not be detected, because they 
may be confounded with other explanatory variables. However, to be able to detect further 
patterns of heterogeneity at this fine level is impossible without some additional structure (due 
to high estimation noise otherwise). Therefore, we use first a linear model estimated by Post-
LASSO and second a k-means clustering algorithm to understand further possible heterogene-
ities better. 
To implement the Post-LASSO procedure, we randomly split the sample into two. In first 
part we run a LASSO. In the second part we run OLS using the variables with non-zero coeffi-
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cients in the LASSO estimation.13F13 That way, standard OLS inference remains valid (given the 
selected model and the estimated dependent variables).  
A first observation is that the LASSO selects many variables: As many as 124 out of 175 
variables for the comparison SVT to NOP and 122 variables for the other two comparisons to 
NOP. Moreover, most of the estimated coefficients are statistically significantly different from 
zero. Most GATE results are confirmed with some nuance. Proficiency in Dutch and born in 
Belgium decreases effectiveness. However, there is no specific region of origin that uniformly 
performs better: This depends on the considered programme. Higher education, except for ac-
ademic bachelors,14F14 generally decreases the effectiveness. However, the programmes no longer 
seem most effective for high school drop-outs, but rather for those who completed part-time 
professional education and special education for persons with some physical or mental disabil-
ity.15F15 High school dropout seems to be confounded by other factors that determine programme 
effectiveness.  
The Post-LASSO regressions indeed reveal some new dimensions in which the pro-
gramme effectiveness varies: effectiveness consistently increases for women, with age, with 
the unemployment duration at which the programmes start. The finding of higher effect for 
women and long-term unemployed is in line with the results of meta-analysis (Card, Kluve and 
Weber, 2018). In addition, recent (in the last 2-5 years) experience in both unemployment and 
employment, decreases programme effectiveness. This means that programmes are more effec-
tive for those who were out of the labour force, possibly because they were not living in the 
country. For those with high long-term (within last 10 years) employment history the pro-
grammes seem to work better, presumably because their employment experience became ob-
                                                                
13  Categorial variables are expanded into a full set of dummy variables. 
14 This exception does not hold for OT. 
15  Since individuals who are currently disabled are excluded from the dataset, these must be individuals with some mild or 
temporary disability.  
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solete. We also find that for those who entered the labour market for the first time as unem-
ployed or for those who at some point since 1991 were recipients of social assistance the pro-
grammes systematically perform worse. There are further dimensions in which heterogeneity 
is detected, such as the previous sector of employment, the type of and experience in the desired 
profession, having kids, the region of residence and whether one lives in a city or not. However, 
for these dimensions the direction of the effectiveness depends on the programme.              
 Next, complementing the heterogeneity analysis of the previous section, we describe the 
dependence of the effects on covariates by k-means++ clustering (Arthur and Vassilvitskii 
2007). The clustering is implemented by jointly using the IATEs of the 3 programme effects 
relative to NOP to form eight clusters. For reasons of conciseness, the clustering is only pre-
sented for the cumulative employment outcome 30 months after the programme start. The re-
sults are contained in Table 5.3.  
The clustering is close to uniformly monotone in the effectiveness of all programmes and 
the columns in Table 5.3 are ordered accordingly. The analysis reveals again the important 
heterogeneity in the programme effects. The employment gains range from 1.2 to 8.0 months 
for SVT, from -1.7 to +4.9 months for LVT and from -2.8 to +1.9 for OT. The programmes are 
clearly the most effective for those with the lowest proficiency in Dutch, born abroad and with 
very little recent unemployment and employment experience, on average respectively one and 
five months in the last two years. This profile can only match recent entries into the labour 
market. Eastern and Southern EU are the most representative countries of origin of the most 
effective group, but it is notable that individuals from of Turkey and Morocco and from the rest 
if the world – migrants with worst labour market performance in Flanders16F16 – are most repre-
sented in the second most effective group. Taken this together (and that the mean age rules out 
                                                                
16  In 2018 the employment rate for those born in a non-EU28 country was 61.2% while it was 76.2% for natives (Source: 
Labour force survey as reported by www.steunpuntwerk.be).  
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recent school leavers), it become obvious that the group for which the programmes are most 
effective consist mainly of recent migrant. Additionally, living in a city rather than in rural areas 
and postponed programme starts are also associated with larger programme effects.  
The two least effective groups are natives with excellent proficiency in Dutch and rela-
tively much recent (last 2 years) and less recent (last 10 years) employment experience. Their 
first entry on the labour market was typically as unemployed job seekers. It is also notable that 
there is no clear relationship between programme effectiveness on the one hand and age and 
gender on the other.          
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of clusters based on k-means clustering  
Cluster Least 
beneficial 
2 3 4 5 6 7 Most  
beneficial 
Share of observations in % 20 16 18 16 10 11 5 5 
 Mean 
 Individualized average treatment effects (IATE) for the 
comparison to NOP (no participation) 
SVT-NOP 1.2 1.4 2.4 4.2 5.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 
LVT-NOP -0.1 -1.7 0.5 1.1 2.7 3.9 2.1 4.9 
OT-NOP -2.6 -2.8 -1.7 0.0 -2.8 -0.6 2.5 1.9 
 Selected features 
Age  32 28 40 39 36 36 37 35 
Women (in %) 74 0 60 40 61 65 12 48 
Living in a city (in %) 29 32 29 28 51 45 48 47 
Proficiency in Dutch (3: high, 0: none) 3.0 3.0 2.8 1.9 2.4 2.3 1.1 0.8 
Country of birth: Belgium (in %) 100 100 95 72 1 0 9 0 
Country of birth: Western & Northern EU (in %) 0 0 0 1 12 38 12 14 
Country of birth: Southern EU (in %) 0 0 0 1 0 4 5 18 
Country of birth: Eastern EU (in %) 0 0 0 0 1 24 4 58 
Country of birth: Turkey & Morocco (in %) 0 0 0 6 0 16 42 7 
Country of birth: Rest of the World (in %) 0 0 5 18 86 18 28 3 
BIT (unemployed at first labour market entry; in %) 52 72 23 18 27 16 5 0 
# of months unemployed in last 10 years prior to UI 14 19 24 18 29 15 13 1.6 
# of months employed in last 10 years prior to UI 57 49 56 60 52 37 23 7 
# of months unemployed in last 2 years prior to UI 4 4 5 4 5 3 3 1 
# of months employed in last 2 years prior to UI 18 17 16 17 17 14 10 5 
# of days until programme start 75 84 109 96 97 106 98 108 
Predicted outcome without programme (NOP)  19 18 17 15 13 13 13 13 
Note:  Outcome variable is cumulative employment 30 months after programme start. All IATEs for all comparisons to 
nonparticipation are used to form the eight clusters. Covariates are not used to form clusters. K-means ++ algo-
rithm used (Vassilvitskii, 2007). 
Finally, one way to characterise the employability of the unemployed is to consider their 
estimated months of employment under NOP. The last row in Table 5.3 shows that in those 
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eight groups, programme effectiveness monotonically decreases with increasing employability, 
which is consistent with the picture of heterogeneity revealed so far. 
6 Policy experiments 
So far, we have documented considerable heterogeneity in the effectiveness of the pro-
grammes that we have evaluated. A natural question that then emerges is whether caseworkers 
exploit this information and assign the unemployed to the programmes that work best for them 
and, if not, to what extent a different assignment could improve the performance of the PES. 
We take up this question in this section by simulating some hypothetical programme allocations 
which we compare to the observed allocation.  
Table 6.1: Overall effects of some simulated hypothetical programme allocations 
                                                                      Share of different programme states in %  Cumulative number of months 
30 months after programme 
start 
 NOP SVT LVT OT Em-
ployed 
Out-of-
labour- 
force  
Unem-
ployed 
Observed 94.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 16.10 3.01 10.89 
Random 94.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 16.11 3.01 10.88 
Optimal – no constraint 2.6 97.3 0.2 0.2 19.42 1.64 8.94 
Optimal – no constraint, only significant 39.7 58.1 1.6 0.5 18.82 1.79 9.39 
Optimal – constraint, preference to large gains 94.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 16.41 2.80 10.79 
Optimal – constraint, preference to worst NOP outcomes 94.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 16.26 2.90 10.84 
Optimal – constraint, preference to lots of UE in the past*) 94.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 16.21 2.94 10.85 
Note:  Allocations minimize unemployment and maximise employment (equally weighted). *) If programmes capacity be-
comes a constraint, preference is given to unemployment the highest number of months in unemployment over the 
last 10 years. 
The first line of Table 6.1 describes the consequences in terms of cumulative number of 
months employed, unemployed (UE) and out of the labour force (OLF) 30 months after the 
programme start of the observed allocation to the different ALMP. In the first four columns the 
share of the total population allocated to the different programmes is reported, while the three 
last columns display the impact on these outcomes. The second line in this table shows the 
outcome of a simulation in which all members of the population would have been randomly 
assigned to the different programmes with probabilities of assignment equal to the observed 
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shares of participation in the different programmes. This would in fact correspond to an alloca-
tion in which no information about the programme effectiveness would be used. The outcome 
of this simulation shows that the average programme impacts of the observed allocation are 
identical to the ones obtained with random assignment.       
The previous result clearly shows that the Flemish PES can improve the performance of 
the ALMP by adjusting the assignment according to the expected programme performance of 
individuals as estimated by their IATE. We consider several alternative assignment schemes 
depending on the available programme capacity, the degree of certainty about the effectiveness 
of programme participation and the objectives of the PES. The third line shows the results in 
case that the PES would not have any capacity constraints and the PES would maximize the 
number of months in employment and minimize the number of months in UE, each with equal 
weight. In this case, the PES would allocate more than 97% of the unemployed to SVT, about 
0.2% to LVT and to OT, and less than 3% would remain untrained. Such an assignment could 
on average increase the number of months in employment by 3.3 (an increase of about 20%) 
by reducing the number of months in UE by 1.9 and OLF by 1.4. Obviously, this would be very 
costly, because it would massively increase the number of SVT participants. Whether the ben-
efits for society would outweigh these costs is unclear, since we do not have access to the re-
quired information to conduct such cost-benefit analysis.  
The previous allocation ignores the fact that same estimated IATE are positive (or re-
verse) just because of estimation error. Therefore, in line four we report the outcome of a sim-
ulation in which we assign individuals only to programmes to the extent that the corresponding 
IATEs are significantly positive or negative at the 2.5% level of a one-sided statistical test, 
respectively in terms of their effect on the time spent in employment or UE. From this simula-
tion we see that for a large part of the population (39%) the IATEs are not significantly different 
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from zero and relatively small, as the programme effects decrease in a much lesser proportion. 
The average gain in terms of employment is still 2.7 months which is nearly 17%.  
The next lines consider cases in which it is assumed that the training capacity of the PES 
is constrained to the current one (and thus programme costs remain the same). Since only 6% 
of the population participates in training this cannot but dramatically reduce the gains that a 
relocation can generate. Three scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, priority is given 
to individuals with the highest returns to programme participation.17F17 The average employment 
gain for the population is still 9.3 days (i.e. 0.31 months). Per participant this is on average 
more than 5 months (or 155 days). This is indeed a substantial gain. In the second scenario we 
give priority to individuals who have the worst NOP outcome. We find that this assignment 
rule realizes about half of the potential gain (as has already been suggested by the clustering 
results of Table 5.3). This suggests that there is some trade-off between equity and efficiency 
if the relevant outcome measure is the cumulative number of months employed. Finally, when 
priority is given to those who have lots of unemployment experience in the past, we obtain 
again a slightly smaller gain. In conclusion, while the gains in reallocation could be substantial, 
simple allocation rules are not able to achieve them.   
7 Sensitivity analysis 
7.1 Placebo analysis 
To further convince the reader (and us) that the matching variables sustain the CIA, we 
provide a placebo validation test like the one proposed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, pp. 
48–50). This validation consists in estimating with the same methodology the ATEs within a 
                                                                
17  In case of excess demand for programs, priority is given to those individuals for whom the difference in performance 
between the best and the second-best program is maximal. Such a rule performs better than assigning individuals to their 
best choice, because this avoids that the gain of doing so is destroyed by the loss that a second choice for rationed individuals 
imposes. 
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preceding unemployment spell of participating in a future training programme. Since (unantic-
ipated) future participation in training should not have any impact on the current outcomes, 
finding an effect close to zero provides some support for CIA.   
To implement this placebo test, we select from the population of analysis the subpopula-
tion that has experienced at least one unemployment spell – in case of multiple spells, we retain 
the first observed one – starting between September 2008 and February 2014. February 2014 is 
used, because it leads to a gap of 9 months between the start of the last unemployment spell 
that was retained for the placebo sample and the first considered entry in the main analysis, i.e. 
December 2014. This gap allows to estimate the placebo treatment effects during 9 months 
since the start of the preceding unemployment spell. This choice of 9 months aims at finding a 
balance between not reducing the size of the placebo population too much – this size declines 
rapidly with the size of the gap time – and having a sufficiently long period over which to 
measure the placebo effects. To avoid contamination, we dropped all individuals who entered 
an ALMP during this preceding unemployment spell. The eventual sample on which this pla-
cebo analysis is conducted consists of 17,943 non-participants, and 360, 336 and 285 partici-
pants in SVT, LVT and OT, respectively. 
Table 7.1 reports the results for three outcomes: cumulative number of months employed, 
unemployed and out-of-the-labour force 9 months after entry in the preceding unemployment 
spell. The results show that all ATEs are close to zero and precisely estimated despite the rather 
small programme groups.  
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Table 7.1: Placebo Effects for the different future programmes on cumulative months in 
employment, unemployment and out of the labour force (ATE) 
 No ALMP participation 
(NOP) 
Short vocational 
training (SVT) 
Long vocational training 
(LVT) 
Orientation training 
(OT) 
Cumulative months in employment 9 months after entry in the preceding unemployment spell 
NOP 3.9 (0.1)    
SVT 0.01 (0.3) 3.9 (0.3)   
LVT 0.5 (0.3) 0.5 (0.4) 4.3 (0.3)  
OT 0.001 (0.4)  -0.02 (0.4) 0.5 (0.4) 3.9 (0.2) 
Cumulative months in unemployment 9 months after entry in the preceding unemployment spell 
NOP 4.8 (0.04)    
SVT -0.1 (0.3) 4.8 (0.3)   
LVT -0.4 (0.3) -0.5 (0.4) 4.4 (0.3)  
OT -0.002 (0.3) -0.1 (0.4) 0.4 (0.4) 4.8 (0.3) 
Cumulative months out of the labour force 9 months after entry in the preceding unemployment spell 
NOP 0.4 (0.01)    
SVT -0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (0.02)   
LVT -0.1 (0.1) -0.005 (0.1) 0.3 (0.1)  
OT -0.03 (0.1) 0.04 (0.2) 0.04 (0.2) 0.3 (0.1) 
Note:  Outcomes measured in months. Level of potential outcome for the particular programme on main diagonal in bold. 
All effects are population averages for the respective placebo programme participants given in the column. Stand-
ard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate the precision of the estimate by showing whether the p-value of a two-
sided significance test is below 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.  
7.2 Tuning parameters 
To investigate the stability of the MCF estimates with respect to various tuning parame-
ters (see also Appendix B for more details), we performed the following sensitivity exercises: 
(i) The number of bootstrap replications has been increased from 1000 to 2000 replications; (ii) 
the minimum leaf size has been varied from 5 to 3 and 7; (iii) the subsampling share was de-
creased from 67% to 50%; (iv) the number of variables used for splitting any particular leaf has 
been varied; (v) estimation was performed with and without prior deselection of irrelevant fea-
tures, and (vi) the penalty term in the MCF objective function has been increased 10 fold from 
its base value that equals the variance of the respective outcome variable. None of these varia-
tions led to any substantial changes in the estimation results. 
7.3 Distribution of weights 
As it has already mentioned that estimated causal effects from Causal Forests have a rep-
resentation as weighted means of the outcome variable. These weights can be investigated to 
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check the stability of the estimation. If few weights are very large, this indicates that very few 
observations play a very important role to estimate the counterfactual. For example, Huber, 
Lechner, Wunsch (2013) considered weights with values larger 4% of the total (absolute) sum 
of weights as being a concern. It turned out that for the ATEs and the GATEs none of the 
weights are above 1%, respectively 3%. The exception is the GATE for the country of origin, 
for which in the subsamples of training participants, about 0.4% of the observations have 
weights between 4% and 10%. For the IATEs the situation is more extreme (as is reflected in 
larger standard errors shown above) as the weights are naturally more concentrated: In the train-
ing subsamples, about 1-2% of the weights are above 4% and in very rare occasions they could 
become as large as 25%. Further research will show the implications of such large weights, and 
how they might be adjusted to avoid small sample issue. In the same vein it becomes clear that 
much larger samples are needed for a reliable estimation of the IATEs than the for ATE or 
GATEs. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper we used recent developments in causal machine learning to investigate the 
average and heterogeneous effects of very recent training programmes in Belgium, using ad-
ministrative individual data from the Public Employment Service of Flanders. We found that 
on average all programmes have positive employment effects in the medium run, although 
sometimes not large enough to compensate, after 2.5 years, for the early negative effects in the 
lock-period. It turned out that on average short vocational training is more effective than longer 
vocational training courses as well as orientation training. Analysing the heterogeneity of the 
effects, the striking result appeared that programmes seem to work better (even after the lock-
in period) for unemployed with a low employability, in particular recent migrants with limited 
language skills. Using the fine-grained results for analysing the assignment policy of Flanders’ 
public employment service revealed considerable inefficiency. A different allocation of unem-
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ployed to existing programme slots should lead to a substantial improvement in labour market 
performance at no or small additional costs.  
We may compare these findings with the meta study of Card, Kluve and Weber (2018) 
who analysed the effectiveness of active labour market policies (ALMP) based on more than 
200 papers. In line with their general findings, we detect close to zero effects in the short-run 
due to lock-in, but that training programmes become effective after two to three years. They 
generally find that programmes with more human capital accumulation (i.e. training) are more 
effective in the longer run. Our findings nuance these conclusions as our evidence shows that 
SVT is as effective as LVT even in the long-run. Card et al. (2018) find that heterogeneity is 
relevant, but they do not report, as we do, higher effectiveness for (recent) migrants or with 
respect to the level of education. They report evidence of higher impacts for women, long-term 
unemployed and during recessions. We never find a differential impact for residence in high 
unemployment regions. Unemployment duration matters in the lock-in phase (9 months after 
programme start), aside of other factors that are negatively related with the employability in the 
absence of programme participation: the negative impact of lock-in diminishes as non-partici-
pants are less likely to be employed. We also find evidence that programmes are more effective 
for women, aside of many other factors, but only after controlling for other determinants of the 
programme effects in post-LASSO regressions in which we regress estimated effects on poten-
tial heterogeneity factors.   
On a methodological note, the Modified Causal Forest (MCF) approach (Lechner, 2018) 
seems to be well suited for such an analysis and appeared to led to plausible and informative 
results at reasonable computational costs. 
Future work could address many open issues, such as extending the data base with respect 
to additional control variable such that the effects of other programmes of the active labour 
market policy of Flanders that are ignored here can be credibly evaluated as well. Furthermore, 
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it will be interesting to see whether similar heterogeneity appears in other countries with com-
parable policies. More generally, extending the CML framework such as to be able to address 
assignment dynamics is likely to lead to additional insight about policy effectiveness and as-
signment optimality. Finally, using an explicit optimal policy approach (e.g., Athey and Wager, 
2019b, Zhou, Athey, and Wager, 2018) and comparing it with our IATEs based approach is an 
interesting exercise that could lead to further valuable insights about possible gains from alter-
native allocations of unemployed to programmes. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A.1: Means and standardized differences for conditioning variables and outcomes  
 
No ALMP 
participation 
(NOP)3 
Short vocational 
training (SVT) 
Long vocational 
training (LVT) 
Orientation 
training (OT) 
A. Conditioning variables 
(Pseudo-) Duration until first treatment, in days 
(Daction) 92.66 124.39  122.81  119.17 
  (51.73) (49.29) (43.62) 
Gender (female =1)(Woman) .49 .31 .40 .47 
  (35.73) (16.48) (3.16) 
Age in years (age) 35.09 34.01 34,00 33.63 
  (11.87) (12.28) (16.53) 
Living in a city (city) .36 .37 .32 .31 
  (2.43) (6.98) (11.02) 
Knowledge of french (frans) .63 .54 .72 .67 
  (17.87) (20.85) (9.07) 
Knowledge of english (engels) .70 .66 .82 .79 
  (7.86) (29.32) (20.30) 
Knowledge of german (duits) .25 .19 .34 .32 
  (13.20) (19.35) (16.31) 
Knowledge of italian (italiaans) .03 .02 .02 .03 
  (6.85) (4.25) (3.92) 
Knowledge of spanish (spaans) .08 .05 .07 .07 
  (12.83) (2.42) (4.02) 
Proficiency in dutch ² (Lang_dutch) 2.44 2.51 2.72 2.64 
  (8.68) (39.74) (27.10) 
Ever been in BIT before current unemployment 
spell (cat_2) .33 .36 .43 .40 
  (5.04) (20.62) (14.14) 
 Ever been in unemployment without U-benifit 
before current unemployment spell (cat_3) .24 .29 .24 .25 
  (9.64) (1.53) (2.39) 
Ever been on welfare before current 
unemployment spell (cat_5) .07 .14 .04 .08 
  (22.27) (11.62) (4.27) 
Having had an unemployment benifit sanction 
before current unemployment spell (cat_14) .06 .07 .04 .03 
  (6.63) (9.15) (12.71) 
Ever have had a sickness benifit before current 
unemployment spell  (cat_76) .12 .14 .10 .11 
  (4.52) (8.43) (4.86) 
Ever been back to education before current 
unemployment spell (cat 77)  .04 .04 .06 .06 
  (1.08) (10.59) (9.76) 
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Table A.1, continued 
 Ever been part time working, part time 
unemployed before current unemployment spell  .19 .15 .14 .17 
(cat_80)  (9.68) (12.74) (3.20) 
Ever been in BIT and part time work before 
current unemployment spell  (cat_82) .05 .03 .05 .06 
  (11.43) (2.37) (4.67) 
Ever been in on-the-job-training before current 
unemployment spell (cat_85) .11 .16 .16 .17 
  (14.76) (16.18) (18.82) 
Ever been in temporary agency work before 
current unemployment spell (cat_89) .21 .28 .27 .24 
  (16.80) (14.02) (7.47) 
Ever been working full-time but looking for 
another job before current unemployment spell  .29 .33 .42 .40 
(cat_90)  (8.76) (27.23) (23.20) 
Ever been working part time  + part time in 
education before current unemployment spell  .01 .02 .01 .02 
(cat_91)  (8.68) (7.36) (2.10) 
Ever been working part time and part time 
looking for a job before current unemployment  .18 .14 .15 .18 
spell (cat_93)  (11.86) (6.84) (1.33) 
Ever have had limited search obligations 
because of family or social reasons before  .02 .01 .01 .02 
current unemployment spell (cat_96)  (.86) (7.73) (.29) 
Ever have had limited search obligations 
because participation in training before current 
unemployment spell (cat_97) .03 .03 .04 .04 
  (.84) (4.67) (3.08) 
Number of months in unemployment in the 10 
years before current spell (Unem_10jaar) 18.05 19.12 15.91 17.3 
  (5.44) (11.14) (3.80) 
Number of months with sickness benefit in the 
10 years before current spell (ziek_10jaar) 1.05 .99 .72 1.03 
  (1.09) (7.27) (.32) 
Number of months unknown position in the 10 
years before current spell (mystery_10jaar) 9.11 9.44 9.91 10.17 
  (1.53) (3.55) (4.76) 
 Number of months of work in the 10 years 
before current spell (werk_10jaar) 48.69 54.18 59.48 54.89 
  (14.35) (28.13) (16.24) 
Number of months in unemployment in the 5 
years before current spell (unem_5jaar) 10.52 11.24 8.91 9.81 
  (5.80) (13.63) (5.88) 
Number of months with sickness benefit in the 5 
years before current spell (ziek_5jaar) .66 .50 .48 .60 
  (5.11) (5.94) (1.79) 
Number of months in unknown position in the 5 
years before current spell (mystery_5jaar) 2.89 3.32 3,00 3.39 
  (4.49) (1.15) (5.01) 
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Table A.1, continued 
Number of months of work in the 5 years before  31.81 35.30 38.64 36.3 
current spell (werk_5jaar)  (16.87) (33.31) (21.77) 
Number of months in unemployment in the 2  3.89 3.77 2.97 3.18 
years before current spell (unem_2jaar)  (2.18) (18.01) (13.79) 
Number of months with sickness benefit in the 2  .22 .16 .19 .17 
years before current spell (ziek_2jaar)  (4.39) (2.02) (3.24) 
Number of months in unknown position in the 2  .53 .64 .58 .67 
years before current spell (mystery_2jaar)  (3.71) (1.50) (4.58) 
Number of months of work in the 2 years before  15.50 17.38 18.50 18.00 
current spell (werk_2jaar)  (22.57) (36.82) (30.32) 
Having experience in the preferred profession 4  1.63 1.86 1.73 1.80 
(exp)  (21.21) (8.73) (14.90) 
Duration previous job in months  17.10 19.86 21.50 20.69 
(duur_laatste_werk)  (20.66) (32.67) (26.87) 
Number of professions the person is interested  2.77 3.04 2.98 3.01 
in (aant_beroepen)  (14.35) (10.86) (12.65) 
Having participated in a training before current  .08 .12 .11 .11 
spell (vroeger_o)  (13.02) (10.77) (10.71) 
Having participated in a training course dutch  .01 .03 .01 .01 
before current spell (vroeger_n)  (10.78) (3.38) (.05) 
Having participated in a on-the-job-training  .07 .10 .11 .12 
before current spell  (vroeger_i)  (11.25) (13.29) (17.30) 
Having participated in intensive couselling  .06 .08 .05 .06 
before current spell (vroeger_t)  (5.04) (4.38) (.31) 
Having participated in a orientation training  .01 .01 .03 .03 
before current spell  (vroeger_r)  (.09) (9.61) (10.54) 
Having participated in another ALMP before  .04 .07 .05 .04 
current spell (vroeger_a)  (13.53) (4.37) (3.04) 
Drivers license car (rijbew_B) .68 .63 .76 .71 
  (10.79) (16.39) (5.91) 
Drivers license truck (rijbew_C) .04 .05 .03 .03 
  (4.81) (4.98) (6.19) 
Divers license bus (rijbew_D) .01 .01 .01 .01 
  (2.84) (.98) (2.46) 
Educ. Attainment: first level secondary  .14 .18 .04 .10 
education or lower (so1)  (10.29) (34.75) (13.63) 
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Table A.1, continued 
Educ. Attainment: part time education,  .04 .06 .03 .04 
professional track (dbso)  (9.51) (2.97) (1.73) 
Educ. Attainment; 2nd level secondary  .02 .02 .02 .03 
education, general & artistic tracks  (akso2)  (1.72) (.84) (4.66) 
Educ. Attainment; 2nd level secondary  .09 .13 .06 .08 
education, professional track (bso2)  (13.53) (9.47) (2.65) 
Educ. Attainment: secundary education for 
pupils with special needs (buso) .02 .04 .01 .02 
  (11.29) (5.18) (1.69) 
Educ. Attainment; 2nd level secondary  .04 .05 .04 .05 
education, technological track  (tso2)  (4.11) (.02) (8.08) 
Educ. Attainment; 3rd level secondary  .08 .08 .13 .11 
education, general & artistic tracks (akso3)  (1.39) (16.86) (10.42) 
 Educ. Attainment; 3rd level secondary  .21 .26 .21 .22 
education, professional track (bso3)  (13.3) (1.41) (4.08) 
Educ. Attainment; 3rd level secondary  .11 .11 .22 .17 
education, technological track  (tso3)  (.27) (29.68) (17.82) 
Educ. Attainment: higher professional education  .02 .01 .02 .02 
(hbo)  (8.48) (4.01) (.52) 
Educ. Attainment: professional bachelor (pba) .13 .04 .14 .11 
  (31.38) (4.19) (4.89) 
Educ. Attainment: academic bachelor  (aba) .02 0.00 .01 .01 
  (11.01) (2.08) (1.02) 
Educ. Attainment: master (ma) .10 .02 .06 .04 
  (32.94) (16.26) (24.03) 
District of residence: Antwerpen (Antwerpen) .23 .18 .17 .11 
  (11.78) (15.21) (31.53) 
District of residence: Mechelen (Mechelen) .05 .04 .04 .04 
  (5.04) (1.23) (2.37) 
District of residence: Turnhout (Turnhout) .06 .08 .09 .03 
  (6.27) (9.15) (13.70) 
District of residence: Leuven (Leuven) .06 .08 .07 .05 
  (4.83) (3.41) (4.95) 
District of residence: Vilvoorde (Vilvoorde) .09 .04 .04 .05 
  (16.56) (17.03) (14.31) 
District of residence: Brugge (Brugge) .04 .07 .05 .05 
  (13.63) (4.33) (4.78) 
District of residence: Ieper or Diksmuide (Ieper) .02 .03 .03 .03 
  (7.74) (6.16) (3.97) 
District of residence: Kortrijk (Kortrijk) .03 .04 .04 .05 
  (2.85) (3.76) (8.18) 
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Table A.1, continued 
District of residence: Oostende (Oostende) .02 .06 .04 .05 
  (16.33) (7.81) (13.80) 
District of residence: Roeselare (Roeselare) .02 .02 .03 .03 
  (2.97) (7.13) (7.55) 
District of residence: Tielt or Veurne (Tielt) .02 .02 .02 .02 
  (5.34) (3.06) (2.45) 
District of residence: Aalst (Aalst) .04 .04 .03 .04 
  (1.27) (9.14) (.88) 
District of residence: Dendermonde 
(Dendermonde) .03 .03 .03 .03 
  (3.77) (.54) (1.18) 
District of residence: Eeklo (Eeklo) .01 .01 .01 .01 
  (1.68) (4.94) (1.27) 
District of residence: Gent (Gent) .09 .06 .09 .09 
  (10.95) (.87) (1.06) 
District of residence: Oudenaarde (Oudenaarde) .02 .01 .00 .03 
  (9.38) (11.69) (6.14) 
District of residence: Sint-Niklaas (Sintniklaas) .04 .03 .04 .02 
  (3.83) (.50) (10.91) 
District of residence: Hasselt (Hasselt) .07 .09 .11 .11 
  (5.16) (14.26) (13.66) 
District of residence: Maaseik (Maaseik) .04 .05 .05 .08 
  (4.27) (7.98) (17.49) 
District of residence: Tongeren (Tongeren) .04 .03 .03 .09 
  (2.39) (1.59) (22.58) 
Country of birth: Belgium (belg) .65 .66 .77 .71 
  (2.09) (28.05) (13.01) 
Country of birth: Western & Northern EU 
(eu_core) .07 .05 .06 .06 
  (5.45) (1.42) (1.16) 
Country of birth: Southern EU (eu_south) .01 .01 .01 .02 
  (3.04) (6.33) (3.00) 
Country of birth: Eastern EU (eu_east) .06 .04 .03 .03 
  (10.12) (13.22) (12.13) 
Country of birth: Turkey & Morocco (tm ) .05 .04 .02 .03 
  (8.27) (16.19) (9.71) 
Country of birth: Rest of the world (row) .16 .21 .10 .14 
  (11.68) (17.18) (4.68) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 1 
(StartUI1) .05 .04 .04 .06 
  (7.93) (7.04) (3.39) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 2 
(StartUI2) .08 .06 .09 .08 
  (5.41) (2.83) (1.55) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 3 
(StartUI3) .05 .06 .04 .07 
  (5.20) (.82) (9.22) 
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Table A.1, continued 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 4   .05 .05 .06 .06 
(StartUI4)  (.82) (4.67) (5.12) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 5  .05 .05 .06 .04 
(StartUI5)  (.02) (4.79) (3.47) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 6  .04 .05 .04 .04 
(StartUI6)  (4.70) (.93) (2.01) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 7  .05 .06 .06 .05 
(StartUI7)  (4.15) (5.87) (1.17) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 8  .07 .06 .07 .06 
(StartUI8)  (2.77) (.66) (2.38) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 9  .06 .05 .06 .05 
(StartUI9)  (4.34) (1.1) (3.39) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 10   .07 .07 .07 .05 
(StartUI10)  (1.17) (2.49) (7.78) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 11  .06 .07 .06 .06 
(StartUI11)  (3.20) (1.67) (.42) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 12  .05 .05 .04 .05 
(StartUI12)  (2.67) (7.03) (3.44) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 13  .05 .06 .04 .05 
(StartUI13)  (4.77) (4.76) (2.23) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 14  .07 .07 .05 .05 
(StartUI14)  (1.22) (7.33) (5.60) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 15  .05 .06 .04 .05 
(StartUI15)  (5.45) (2.35) (.83) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 16) .04 .04 .04 .05 
(StartUI16  (.64) (.47) (3.98) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 17  .04 .03 .05 .04 
(StartUI17)  (2.49) (6.41) (2.38) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 18  .04 .03 .05 .04 
(StartUI18)  (2.16) (4.51) (1.79) 
Calendar month start unemployment spell 19   .04 .04 .05 .03 
(StartUI19)  (.09) (3.08) (4.86) 
Preferred profession 2 5 (prof2) .10 .04 .20 .20 
  (25.87) (29.63) (29.52) 
Preferred profession 19 5 (prof19) .05 .09 .05 .05 
  (16.09) (.39) (2.48) 
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Preferred profession 21 5 (prof21) .03 0,00 .02 .01 
  (20.17) (5.93) (14.05) 
Preferred profession 24 5 (prof24) .02 .01 .02 .02 
  (10.78) (5.95) (6.21) 
Preferred profession 25 5 (prof25) .05 .06 .05 .06 
  (3.85) (2.10) (5.01) 
Preferred profession 26 5 (prof26) .04 .05 .04 .04 
  (3.21) (3.93) (3.08) 
Preferred profession 27 5 (prof27) .02 .01 .01 .01 
  (3.29) (3.87) (9.65) 
Preferred profession 29 5 (prof29) .05 .07 .03 .03 
  (7.66) (13.38) (11.40) 
Preferred profession 30 5 (prof30) .01 .02 .01 .01 
  (3.46) (.25) (2.07) 
Preferred profession 31 5 (prof31) .07 .12 .06 .06 
  (18.21) (.68) (3.04) 
Preferred profession 32 5 (prof32) .04 .01 .06 .06 
  (15.57) (12.47) (11.31) 
Preferred profession 33 5 (prof33) .02 .01 .04 .04 
  (10.63) (10.59) (8.46) 
Preferred profession 34 5 (prof34) .02 .02 .01 .01 
  (1.41) (7.56) (3.33) 
Preferred profession 35 5 (prof35) .01 .02 .01 .02 
  (8.81) (2.30) (7.52) 
Preferred profession 36 5 (prof36) .01 .01 .01 .01 
  (4.18) (2.72) (2.55) 
Preferred profession 37 5 (prof37) .02 .03 .03 .03 
  (5.92) (5.33) (5.98) 
Preferred profession 38 5 (prof38) .01 .01 .03 .02 
  (.95) (10.76) (5.56) 
Preferred profession 39 5 (prof39) .01 .01 .02 .01 
  (.63) (7.66) (1.66) 
Preferred profession 40 5 (prof40) .05 .05 .03 .03 
  (2.33) (12.74) (8.74) 
Preferred profession 41 5 (prof41) .02 0,00 .02 .02 
  (16.53) (6.20) (.01) 
Preferred profession 42 5 (prof42) .18 .26 .18 .18 
  (19.08) (.44) (2.02) 
Preferred profession 43 5 (prof43) .07 .08 .03 .03 
  (4.95) (20.42) (16.08) 
Preferred profession 44 5 (prof44) .09 .02 .05 .03 
  (32.7) (15.81) (23.52) 
Economic sector of previous job 0 6 (sect0) .30 .31 .27 .29 
  (.57) (7.40) (2.74) 
 
56  
Table A.1, continued 
Economic sector of previous job 1  6 (sect1) .01 .02 .01 .01 
  (7.79) (1.12) (.65) 
Economic sector of previous job 2 6 (sect2) .01 .01 .01 .02 
  (3.74) (.15) (.98) 
Economic sector of previous job 3 6 (sect3) .03 .03 .02 .03 
  (1.09) (4.79) (1.52) 
Economic sector of previous job 4 6 (sect4) .01 .02 .01 .01 
  (6.09) (2.33) (3.01) 
Economic sector of previous job 5 6 (sect5) .03 .03 .02 .04 
  (1.31) (9.20) (4.84) 
Economic sector of previous job 6 6 (sect6) .04 .01 .02 .01 
  (18.70) (12.32) (17.36) 
Economic sector of previous job 7 6 (sect7) .01 .02 .01 .02 
  (3.28) (3.47) (1.41) 
Economic sector of previous job 8 6 (sect8) .02 .02 .02 .02 
  (1.27) (2.02) (3.01) 
Economic sector of previous job 9 6 (sect9) .01 .01 .01 .00 
  (2.03) (5.20) (9.56) 
Economic sector of previous job 10 6 (sect10) .01 .01 .03 .02 
  (1.11) (8.62) (2.18) 
Economic sector of previous job 11 6 (sect11) .02 .03 .02 .02 
  (7.94) (.79) (4.54) 
Economic sector of previous job 12 6 (sect12) .01 .03 .02 .01 
  (11.83) (4.21) (2.80) 
Economic sector of previous job 13 6 (sect13) .01 .01 .02 .01 
  (3.40) (1.62) (.16) 
Economic sector of previous job 14 6 (sect14) .01 .01 .01 .02 
  (.51) (.55) (6.46) 
Economic sector of previous job 15 6 (sect15) .02 .02 .02 .02 
  (1.01) (1.41) (1.13) 
Economic sector of previous job 16 6 (sect16) .01 .01 .01 .01 
  (5.55) (2.44) (5.10) 
Economic sector of previous job 17 6 (sect17) .01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
  (6.72) (6.28) (6.87) 
Economic sector of previous job 18 6 (sect18) .02 .02 .03 .03 
  (1.33) (2.92) (5.99) 
Economic sector of previous job 19 6 (sect19) .01 .01 .02 .02 
  (.92) (8.82) (3.83) 
Economic sector of previous job 20 6 (sect20) .01 .02 .02 .01 
  (1.79) (6.13) (4.33) 
Economic sector of previous job 21 6 (sect21) .03 .04 .04 .03 
  (4.90) (5.11) (1.08) 
Economic sector of previous job 22 6 (sect22) .02 .02 .02 .03 
  (2.42) (1.91) (3.90) 
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Table A.1, continued 
Economic sector of previous job 23 6 (sect23) .02 .03 .01 .01 
  (6.04) (3.87) (5.17) 
Economic sector of previous job  24 6 (sect24) .02 .02 .03 .02 
  (5.74) (8.77) (3.64) 
Economic sector of previous job 25 6 (sect25) .01 .01 .01 .01 
  (2.72) (6.91) (1.75) 
Economic sector of previous job 26 6 (sect26) .01 .01 .01 .01 
  (1.82) (6.46) (4.73) 
Economic sector of previous job 27 6 (sect27) .02 .01 .01 .01 
  (6.63) (9.14) (3.42) 
Economic sector of previous job 28 6 (sect28) .01 .02 .02 .02 
  (6.81) (8.84) (5.50) 
Economic sector of previous job 29 6 (sect29) .02 .04 .04 .03 
  (10.86) (10.77) (6.08) 
Economic sector of previous job 30 6 (sect30) .01 .02 .01 .01 
  (4.86) (2.39) (1.08) 
Economic sector of previous job 31 6 (sect31) .01 .02 .01 .01 
  (7.53) (.86) (.92) 
Economic sector of previous job 32 6 (sect32) .02 .02 .01 .01 
  (1.29) (3.36) (7.06) 
Economic sector of previous job  33 6 (sect33) .03 .01 .05 .04 
  (11.67) (7.34) (5.03) 
Economic sector of previous job 34 6 (sect34) .04 .02 .05 .04 
  (12.25) (2.30) (.82) 
Economic sector of previous job 35 6 (sect35) .06 .04 .06 .07 
  (9.90) (1.35) (5.45) 
Economic sector of previous job 36 6 (sect36) .02 .02 .03 .02 
  (5.95) (2.73) (5.31) 
Number of kids=0 (Nkids0) .12 .17 .14 .17 
  (16.13) (7.96) (16.31) 
Number of kids=1 (Nkids1) .04 .04 .04 .04 
  (3.24) (3.22) (3.32) 
Number of kids=2 (Nkids2) .03 .03 .03 .03 
  (1.51) (2.39) (.91) 
Number of kids > 3 (Nkids3) .02 .01 .01 .01 
  (4.71) (7.42) (2.27) 
Number of kids missing (Nkids4) .80 .75 .79 .75 
  (10.19) (2.15) (11.15) 
Household head: no (head0) .45 .48 .49 .48 
  (5.31) (7.75) (5.00) 
Household head: yes (head1) .09 .08 .06 .07 
  (3.58) (11.06) (6.95) 
Household head: unknown (head2) .45 .44 .44 .45 
  (3.28) (1.79) (1.14) 
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Table A.1, continued 
B. Outcomes     
Cumulative months in employment 9 months 
after programme start (Cwa9) 3.51 3.35 2.34 2.03 
  (4.83) (36.91) (46.35) 
Cumulative months in unemployment 9 months 
after programme start (Cua9) 4.90 5.44 6.44 6.68 
  (16.16) (49.18) (56.21) 
Cumulative months out of the labour force 9 
months after programme start (Cia9) .58 .21 .22 .29 
  (25.63) (25.93) (20.23) 
Cumulative months in employment 30 months 
after programme start (Cwa30) 16.04 18.45 17.11 14.82 
  (24.06) (10.83) (11.92) 
Cumulative months in unemployment 30 months 
after programme start (Cua30) 10.83 10.11 11.75 13.47 
  (8.42) (10.66) (29.89) 
Cumulative months out of the labour force 30 
months after programme start (Cia30) 3.13 1.44 1.14 1.71 
  (27.71) (34.03) (23.14) 
Number of observations 59,964 1,305 1,22 1,115 
Notes:  1 The standardized difference is �?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗 − ?̅?𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁� �[𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)] 2⁄�  , where ?̅?𝑥𝑗𝑗  and 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗) are the 
sample mean and variance of the variable 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  for 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆}.  
2 Proficiency in Dutch = 0 if no knowledge; = 1 if limited; = 2 if good; =3 if very good.  
3 For non-participants in ALMP (NOP) the date at which the ALMP starts is predicted (See Section 4.4). 
4 Experience:  no experience (0), limited experience (1), good experience (2), a lot of experience (3) 
5 2 = General clerk; 19 = Goods handlers; 21 = Managers of a department or service; 24 = Educators; 25 = Sales 
support staff; 26 = Sales representatives; 27 = Representatives; 29 = Hall staff; 30 = Food workers; 31 = Construction 
workers and technicians; 32 = Specialised administrative staff; 33 = Computer and ICT staff; 34 = Agricultural, horti-
cultural and forestry workers and fishermen; 35 = Vehicle mechanics; 36 = Staff involved in tourism, leisure and sport; 
37 = Metalworkers; 38 = Draughtsmen and designers; 39 = Transport and logistics personnel; 40 = Nurses and carers, 
Law enforcement and rescue workers, Medics, Paramedics and laboratory assistants; 41 = Private sector consultants, 
Bank and insurance experts, Business consultants; 42 = Craftsmen, Drivers, Apparel and leatherworkers, Miscellane-
ous production workers, Printers, Electricians and electricians; Woodworkers, Industrial technicians, Machinists and 
crane operators; Metal production workers, Operators chemistry and plastics, Precision technicians, Technical man-
agers, Textile workers, Rail, water and air transport workers; 43 = Personal service providers, Cleaning and mainte-
nance personnel; 44 = Architects and surveyors, Artists, artists and other cultural professions, Controllers and inspec-
tors, Instruction, training and education personnel, Media personnel, Teaching and management personnel in schools, 
Researchers and experts study service, Socio-cultural workers; 6 0 = Missing; 1 = Construction of houses; 2 = Retail 
sale of clothing; 3 = Dining facility full service; 4 = Dining facility limited service; 5 = General cleaning of buildings; 6 = 
Ordinary general secondary education; 7 = Other social work; 8 = Retail sale of food; 9 = Institutions for the elderly and 
disabled; 10 = Electrical installation, plumbing and other construction installation; 11 = Finishing of buildings; 12 = 
Other specialised construction activities; 13 = Wholesale trade in consumer goods; 14 = Retail trade in consumer 
goods; 15 = Retail trade in other goods; 16 = Other social work activities without accommodation; 17 = Other personal 
services; 18 = Manufacture of food products; 19 = Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment; 20 = Wholesale and retail trade, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 21 = Whole-
sale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 22 = Retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; 23 = Land transport and transport via pipelines; 24 = Warehousing and support activities for trans-
portation; 25 = Food and beverage service activities; 26 = Services to buildings and landscape gardening; 27 = Edu-
cation; 28 = Industry 1; 29 = Industry 2; 30 = Industry 3, Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, Water 
supply; Waste and sewerage management and remediation services; 31 = Construction, wholesale and retail trade; 
Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 32 = Transport and storage, Accommodation and food service activities;33 
= Information and communication, Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities, Professional, scientific and 
technical activities;34 = Administrative and support service activities 1; 35 = Administrative and support service activi-
ties 2, Public administration and defence; compulsory social security, Human health and social work activities; 36 = 
Arts, entertainment and recreation, Other services.  
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Appendix B: Part of econometrics  
B.1 Predictions of the pseudo durations for the NOP  
For all participants in training log duration until the programme start is regressed on all 
the explanatory variables, including the interactions of all the explanatory variables with gen-
der. This was done with a LASSO regression, using the R-package glmnet (Friedman et al., 
2008). A ten-fold cross validation approach is used to determine the penalty term. As the 
LASSO estimates are biased, the regression is re-run using the subset of variables selected by 
the LASSO, to obtain OLS-estimates (Post-Lasso).  Subsequently, the OLS-results are used to 
predict the duration until start in the NOP sample. Then we add to this prediction a draw from 
a Normal distribution with mean zero and the standard error being the one of the OLS regres-
sion.  
The initial NOP sample has 112,128 observations. For 54,255 observations, the duration 
of the unemployment spell is smaller than the predicted duration until start. For 6,732 observa-
tions, the predicted duration until start exceeds nine months. For 5,371 observations, both prob-
lems are present. As a result, there are 55,616 observations where either or both problems apply. 
These observations are dropped from the sample.  
The LASSO regression is not reported while the Post LASSO regression is reported in 
Table B.1. 
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Table B.1: Post LASSO regression of the log duration until the programme start on the 
explanatory variables in a LASSO regression 
Intercept 4,96 (0,16) *** 
Number of months in unemployment in the 10 years before current spell 
(Unem_10jaar) 0,00 (0,00) *** 
Number of months unknown position in the 10 years before current spell 
(mystery_10jaar) 0,00 (0,00) * 
Number of months out of the labour force in the 10 years before current spell 
(olf_10jaar) 0,00 (0,00)  
Number of months of work in the 5 years before current spell (werk_5jaar) 0,00 (0,00) * 
Number of months in unemployment in the 2 years before current spell 
(unem_2jaar) -0,01 (0,00) * 
Number of months unknown position in the 2 years before current spell 
(mystery_2jaar) 0,00 (0,00)  
Number of months out of the labour force in the 2 years before current spell 
(olf_2jaar) 0,00 (0,01)  
Drivers license car (rijbew_B) -0,02 (0,03)  
Drivers license truck (rijbew_C) -0,19 (0,06) *** 
Educ. Attainment: part time education, professional track (dbso) 0,03 (0,05)  
Educ. Attainment; 3rd level secondary education, general track  (aso3) 0,03 (0,03)  
Educ. Attainment; 3rd level secondary education, artistic track  (kso3) 0,08 (0,08)  
Educ. Attainment: master (ma) 0,05 (0,07)  
Age in years (age) -0,01 (0,03)  
Knowledge of english (engels) -0,03 (0,02)  
Knowledge of german (duits) 0,02 (0,03)  
Proficiency in dutch very good (ned3) 0,06 (0,02) ** 
District of residence: Antwerpen (Antwerpen) -0,13 (0,08) * 
District of residence Mechelen(Mechelen) 0,08 (0,05)  
District of residence Turnhout (Turnhout) 0,07 (0,05)  
District of residence Leuven (Leuven) 0,13 (0,06) ** 
District of residence Vilvoorde (Vilvoorde) 0,14 (0,05) *** 
District of residence Brugge (Brugge) -0,22 (0,07) *** 
District of residence Ieper (Ieper) -0,15 (0,07) ** 
District of residence Kortrijk (Kortrijk) 0,06 (0,06)  
District of residence Dendermonde (Dendermonde) -0,13 (0,08)  
District of residence Gent (Gent) 0,14 (0,05) *** 
District of residence Oudenaarde (Oudenaarde) -0,04 (0,11)  
District of residence Hasselt (Hasselt) -0,03 (0,05)  
District of residence Maaseik (Maaseik) 0,09 (0,07)  
District of residence Tongeren (Tongeren) -0,03 (0,06)  
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Table B.1, continued 
Household-head -0,03 (0,01) ** 
Number of professions the person is interested in (aant_beroepen) 0,00 (0,01)  
Ever been in BIT before current unemployment spell (cat_2) -0,02 (0,03)  
Ever been in unemployment without U-benifit before current unemployment spell 
(cat_3) -0,01 (0,02)  
Ever been in PWA before current unemployment spell (cat_30) 0,15 (0,25)  
Ever been in a trajectory from sickness benefit to work before current 
unemployment spell (cat_32) -0,15 (0,10)  
Ever been in Arbeidszorg before current unemployment spell (cat_33) -1,28 (0,47) *** 
Ever been in BIT and part time work before current unemployment spell  (cat_82) -0,02 (0,04)  
Ever been in temporary agency work before current unemployment spell (cat_89) -0,11 (0,03) *** 
Ever been working full-time but looking for another job before current 
unemployment spell (cat_90) -0,08 (0,02) *** 
Ever been working part time + part time in education before current unemployment 
spell (cat_91) -0,14 (0,10)  
Ever been in the specific status given to some high skilled unemployed from 
outside the European Economic Area, before current unemployment spell (cat_94) 0,10 (0,16)  
Ever have had limited search obligations because of family or social reasons before 
current unemployment spell (cat_96) 0,06 (0,36)  
Ever have had limited search obligations because participation in training before 
current unemployment spell (cat_97) -0,04 (0,05)  
Unemployment rate in district of residence (Wlgr) -2,42 (1,59)  
Educational attainment high (High) 0,02 (0,05)  
Age between >=22, < 25 (age_lt25) -0,05 (0,03)  
Age between >=36, < 50 (age_lt50) 0,06 (0,05)  
Age between >=50 and <=55 (age_ge50) 0,13 (0,08)  
Country of birth: Belgium (belg) -0,03 (0,03)  
Country of birth: Western & Northern EU (eu_core) 0,04 (0,06)  
Unemployment spell began in January (m1) -0,12 (0,06) ** 
Unemployment spell began in February (m2) -0,22 (0,06) *** 
Unemployment spell began in March (m3) 0,02 (0,03)  
Unemployment spell began in June (m6) 0,06 (0,05)  
Unemployment spell began in July (m7) -0,05 (0,06)  
Unemployment spell began in August (m8) -0,36 (0,06) *** 
Unemployment spell began in September (m9) -0,27 (0,05) *** 
Unemployment spell began in October (m10) -0,08 (0,05)  
Unemployment spell began in November (m11) -0,16 (0,04) *** 
Unemployment spell began in December (m12) -0,16 (0,04) *** 
Duration previous job in months (duur_laatste_werk) 0,00 (0,00) ** 
Having participated in a on-the-job-training before current spell  (vroeger_i) -0,02 (0,03)  
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Table B.1, continued 
Having participated in a dutch training course before current spell (vroeger_n) -0,02 (0,08)  
Having participated in a training before current spell (vroeger_o) -0,04 (0,04)  
Having participated in an orientation training before current spell (vroeger_r) -0,10 (0,07)  
Having participated in intensive couselling  before current spell (vroeger_t) 0,03 (0,04)  
Having limited experience in the preferred profession (ervaring_beperkt) -0,02 (0,03)  
Having no experience in the preferred profession (ervaring_geen) 0,00 (0,04)  
Knowledge of another language (different from Dutch, English, German, Italian or 
Spanish) (andere_taal) 0,01 (0,04)  
District or residence Aalst, interaction with sex -0,05 (0,07)  
District or residence Antwerpen, interaction with sex 0,13 (0,06) ** 
District or residence Brugge, interaction with sex 0,22 (0,09) ** 
District or residence Dendermonde, interaction with sex 0,17 (0,11)  
District or residence Eeklo, interaction with sex -0,10 (0,11)  
District or residence Gent, interaction with sex -0,08 (0,06)  
District or residence Leuven, interaction with sex -0,20 (0,08) *** 
District or residence Maaseik, interaction with sex -0,13 (0,09)  
District or residence Oostende, interaction with sex 0,06 (0,10)  
District or residence Oudenaarde, interaction with sex -0,27 (0,15) * 
District or residence Roeselare, interaction with sex -0,10 (0,10)  
District or residence Sint-Niklaas, interaction with sex 0,08 (0,08)  
District or residence Turnhout, interaction with sex 0,07 (0,07)  
Educ. Attainment: academic bachelor, interaction with sex -0,13 (0,15)  
Age between >=50 and <=55, interaction with sex 0,05 (0,08)  
Age between >=36, < 50, interaction with sex -0,10 (0,04) ** 
Knowledge of another language (different from Dutch, English, German, Italian or 
Spanish, interaction with sex 0,01 (0,05)  
Educ. Attainment; 2nd level secondary education, general track, interaction with 
sex -0,17 (0,12)  
Educ. Attainment; 3rd level secondary education, professional track , interaction 
with sex -0,03 (0,04)  
Having had an unemployment benifit sanction before current unemployment spell, 
interaction with sex 0,00 (0,07)  
Ever have had a sickness benifit before current unemployment spell, interaction 
with sex -0,09 (0,04) ** 
Ever been back to education before current unemployment spell, interaction with 
sex -0,01 (0,06)  
Ever been part time working, part time unemployed before current unemployment 
spell, interaction with sex 0,03 (0,03)  
Ever been in on-the-job-training before current unemployment spell, interaction with 
sex -0,03 (0,05)  
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Table B.1, continued  
Ever been in temporary agency work before current unemployment spell, 
interaction with sex 0,10 (0,04) ** 
Ever been working part time + part time in education before current unemployment 
spell, interaction with sex 0,14 (0,15)  
Ever been in temporary unemployment before current unemployment spell, 
interaction with sex 0,28 (0,24)  
Ever been working part time and part time looking for a job before current 
unemployment spell, interaction with sex -0,06 (0,03) ** 
Ever have had limited search obligations because of family or social reasons before 
current unemployment spell, interaction with sex 0,08 (0,37)  
Living in a city, interaction with sex 0,03 (0,03)  
Educ. Attainment: part time education, professional track, interaction with sex 0,05 (0,09)  
Knowledge of German, interaction with sex 0,09 (0,05) ** 
No experience in preferred profession, interaction with sex 0,13 (0,05) ** 
Good experience in preferred profession, interaction with sex 0,04 (0,03)  
Country of birth: Western & Northern EU, interaction with sex 0,06 (0,08)  
Country of birth: Southern EU, interaction with sex 0,18 (0,13)  
Knowledge of French, interaction with sex 0,07 (0,03) ** 
Educ. Attainment: higher professional education , interaction with sex -0,10 (0,12)  
Knowledge of Italian , interaction with sex -0,12 (0,09)  
Educational attainment, secondary, 3rd level, interaction with sex -0,03 (0,06)  
Educational attainment is low , interaction with sex 0,02 (0,06)  
Unemployment spell began in January, interaction with sex -0,29 (0,08) *** 
Unemployment spell began in February, interaction with sex 0,19 (0,09) ** 
Unemployment spell began in April, interaction with sex 0,01 (0,05)  
Unemployment spell began in June, interaction with sex -0.15 (0.06) ** 
Unemployment spell began in July, interaction with sex -0,14 (0,07) *** 
Unemployment spell began in August, interaction with sex -0,31 (0,08) *** 
Unemployment spell began in September, interaction with sex 0,07 (0,07)  
Unemployment spell began in October, interaction with sex -0,07 (0,08)  
Unemployment spell began in November, interaction with sex -0,14 (0,06) ** 
Number of months in unknown position in the 5 years before current, interaction 
with sex 0,00 (0,00) ** 
No knowledge of Dutch, interaction with sex 0,19 (0,18)  
Number of months out of the labour market in the 10 years before current spell, 
interaction with sex 0,00 (0,00)  
Number of months out of the labour market in the 5 years before current spell, 
interaction with sex 0,00 (0,00)  
Educ. Attainment: professional bachelor, interaction with sex 0,03 (0,08)  
Drivers license car, interaction with sex -0,06 (0,04)  
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Table B.1, continued 
Drivers license truck, interaction with sex -0,11 (0,22)  
Drivers license bus, interaction with sex -0,16 (0,20)  
Knowledge of Spanish, interaction with sex 0,04 (0,05)  
Country of birth: Turkey & Morocco, interaction with sex 0,12 (0,07) * 
Number of months in unemployment in the 10 years before current spell, interaction 
with sex 0,00 (0,00)  
Number of months in unemployment in the 2 years before current spell, interaction 
with sex 0,01 (0,00)  
Number of months of work in the 10 years before current spell, interaction with sex 0,00 (0,00)  
Number of months with sickness benefit in the 5 years before current spell, 
interaction with sex 0,00 (0,00)  
Having participated in a Dutch training course before current spell, interaction with 
sex -0,22 (0,13) * 
Having participated in a training before current spell, interaction with sex -0,10 (0,06) * 
Note:  Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate the precision of the estimate by showing whether the p-value of a 
two-sided significance test is below 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.  
B.2 Tuning parameters of the MCF 
As the MCF is a causal forest it has its usual tuning parameters. The important ones will 
be discussed in turn:  
Variables for leaf splitting: 6, 15, or 40 randomly selected variables are used in each leaf 
splitting (out of about 61 that usually remained after feature selection described next). For most 
outcomes, 6 variables led to the smallest value of the objective function (which to be mini-
mized) in the out-of-bag samples. Minimum leaf size for feature selection is set to 5.  
Feature selection: A 20% random subsample was (exclusively) used to run a preliminary 
estimation of the MCF forest. The other 80% are used for the remaining estimation steps. The 
permutation based variable importance measure (VIM) was used to deselect variables. Since 
the standard one-variable-at-a-time VIM is always conditional on the other variables included, 
this was done in two steps: 1) VIMs are computed for all (91) variables. Then, these variables 
were sorted with respect to the VIMs and grouped into 10 groups. Next, groupwise VIMs (i.e. 
VIMs based permutating all variable in the group simultaneously) for these groups were com-
puted. For all groups with a non-positive groupwise VIM (only), the following process is im-
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plemented to deleted variables. If the VIM of the worst group is non-positive, the variables in 
that group are deleted. If so, next a group-wise VIM for the worst and the second-to-worst group 
jointly is computed. If this is non-positive as well, the variables in the second-to-worst group 
are also deleted. This process is continued, until the group-wise VIM are positive. This process 
is computationally not cheap but it avoids deleting jointly variables that are relevant, but highly 
correlated (so that each is irrelevant given the others). This process leads to the removal of 30 
variables for most outcomes. 
The minimum leaf size was set to 5. 
The number of subsampling replications was set to 1000 and 67% of the observation used 
to build the forest are contained in each subsample (this comparatively high number was cho-
sen because although the overall number of observations is large, the number of observations 
in each programme and nonparticipation (that eventually determines the depth of the splitting) 
is rather low. 
B.3 Tuning parameters of the Post-Lasso for the IATEs 
The penalty term of the LASSO was determined by a grid of 100 different values, starting 
with the model without covariates to the model with all covariates. On this grid the optimal 
value was determined by ten-fold cross-validation using the mean squared prediction error of 
the Post-Lasso.  
Appendix C: Additional results 
C.1 Average treatment effect on the treated 
Table C.1 shows how the effects differ across the populations of programme participants 
for all average population effects. Numbers in bold always relate to the effect of the programme 
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for its own population of participants (ATET). If caseworkers maximise effects, then one should 
expect the bold number to be the largest entry in each row. 
Table C.1: Comparison of the effects for the different programmes on cumulative months in 
employment, unemployment and out of the labour force for different populations by 
participation status 
 No ALMP participation 
(NOP) 
Short vocational 
training (SVT) 
Long vocational training 
(LVT) 
Orientation training 
(OT) 
Cumulative months in employment 9 months after programme start 
SVT – NOP 0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.1) -0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 
LVT – NOP -1.1 (0.1) *** -1.1 (0.1) *** -1.1 (0.1) *** -1.1 (0.1) *** 
OT – NOP -1.6 (0.1) *** -1.5 (0.1) *** -1.6 (0.1) *** -1.6 (0.1) *** 
LVT – SVT -1.2 (0.2) *** -1.2 (0.2) *** -1.1 (0.2) *** -1.2 (0.2) *** 
OT – SVT -1.6 (0.2) *** -1.6 (0.2) *** -1.6 (0.2) *** -1.6 (0.2) *** 
OT – LVT -0.4 (0.2) ** -0.4 (0.2) ** -0.5 (0.2) ** -0.4 (0.2) ** 
Cumulative months in employment between month 22 and month 30 month after programme start 
SVT – NOP 1.4 (0.2) *** 1.4 (0.2) *** 1.3 (0.2) *** 1.3 (0.2) *** 
LVT – NOP 1.2 (0.2) *** 1.1 (0.2) *** 1.0 (0.2) *** 1.1 (0.2) *** 
OT – NOP 0.5 (0.2) ** 0.5 (0.2) ** 0.4 (0.2) ** 0.4 (0.2) ** 
LVT – SVT -0.1 (0.3) -0.3 (0.2) -0.2 (0.3) -0.2 (0.3) 
OT – SVT -0.9 (0.3) *** -1.0 (0.3) *** -0.9 (0.3) *** -0.9 (0.3) *** 
OT – LVT -0.8 (0.3) -0.7 (0.3) -0.6 (0.2) -0.7 (0.2) 
Cumulative months in employment 30 months after programme start 
SVT – NOP 3.4 (0.5) *** 3.4 (0.4) *** 2.8 (0.6) *** 3.1 (0.6) *** 
LVT – NOP 1.0 (0.5) ** 0.8 (0.5)  0.4 (0.4) 0.6 (0.4)  
OT – NOP -1.4 (0.5) *** -1.5 (0.5) ** -1.8 (0.5) *** -1.7 (0.5) *** 
LVT – SVT -2.4 (0.7) *** -2.6 (0.6) *** -2.4 (0.7) *** -2.4 (0.7) *** 
OT – SVT -4.8 (0.7) *** -4.9 (0.6) *** -4.7 (0.7) *** -4.8 (0.7) *** 
OT – LVT -2.4 (0.7) *** -2.3 (0.7) *** -2.3 (0.6) **** -2.3 (0.6) *** 
Cumulative months in unemployment 30 months after programme start 
SVT – NOP -1.9 (0.3) *** -2.0 (0.3) *** -1.7 (0.3) *** 1.8 (0.3) *** 
LVT – NOP 0.9 (0.4) ** 0.8 (0.5) * 1.1 (0.4) *** 1.0 (0.4) *** 
OT – NOP 2.7 (0.5) *** 2.6 (0.5) *** 2.9 (0.4) *** 2.8 (0.4) *** 
LVT – SVT 2.8 (0.5) *** 2.8 (0.6) *** 2.9 (0.5) *** 2.8 (0.5) *** 
OT – SVT 4.6 (0.6) *** 4.6 (0.6) *** 4.6 (0.5) *** 4.6 (0.5) *** 
OT – LVT 1.8 (0.6) *** 1.8 (0.7) *** 1.8 (0.6) *** 1.8 (0.6) *** 
Cumulative months out-of-the-labour force 30 months after programme start 
SVT – NOP -1.5 (0.3) *** -1.4 (0.3) *** -1.3 (0.2) *** -1.4 (0.3) *** 
LVT – NOP -1.9 (0.3) *** -1.7 (0.2) *** -1.6 (0.2) *** -1.7 (0.2) *** 
OT – NOP -1.4 (0.3) *** -1.3 (0.3) *** -1.1 (0.3) *** -1.2 (0.3) *** 
LVT – SVT -0.4 (0.4) -0.2 (0.3) -0.4 (0.3) -0.4 (0.3) 
OT – SVT 0.1 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 
OT – LVT 0.5 (0.4) 0.4 (0.3) 0.5 (0.3) * 0.5 (0.3)  
Note:  Outcomes measured in months. ATET for the particular programme in bold. All effects are population averages for 
the respective programme participants given in the column. Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate the 
precision of the estimate by indicate whether the p-value of a two-sided significance test is below 10%, 5%, 1% 
respectively.  
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C.2 Distribution of estimated IATEs 
Figure C.1: Distribution of estimated IATE of LVT vs. NOP 
 
Note: Kernel smooth with Epanechnikov Kernel and Silverman (normality) bandwidth. 
Figure C.2: Distribution of estimated IATE of OT vs. NOP 
 
Note: Kernel smooth with Epanechnikov Kernel and Silverman (normality) bandwidth. 
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Figure C.3: Overall heterogeneity: sorted effects of LVT relative to NOP – Employment 30 
month after the programme start   
 
Note:  IATEs are sorted according their size. 90%-confidence interval based on estimated standard errors and normal 
distribution. Standard errors are smoothed by Nadaraya-Watson regression (Epanechikov kernel with Silverman 
bandwidth). 
Figure C.4: Overall heterogeneity: sorted effects of OT relative to NOP – Employment 30 
month after the programme start 
 
Note:  IATEs are sorted according their size. 90%-confidence interval based on estimated standard errors and normal 
distribution. Standard errors are smoothed by Nadaraya-Watson regression (Epanechikov kernel with Silverman 
bandwidth). 
